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I. Introduction
Pneumoconiosis, commonly known as "black lung disease," claims
the lives of almost 1,500 American coal workers every year.' Coal
workers develop black lung disease simply by breathing the air of their
workplace. 2 Black lung disease begins deep within the lungs and evolves
into a chronic and progressive respiratory disease that may lay dormant
for years before totally disabling and killing coal miners.3 For many
years, miners suffering from black lung disease battled against a medical
community that continually denied the deadly effects of the disease,
against coal mine operators willing to sacrifice safety for profits, and
against state workers' compensation programs that obstinately turned a
blind eye to most mine-related injuries and illnesses.4 By 1969, turmoil
over the lack of benefits for those suffering from black lung disease
boiled over into "wildcat strikes" that threatened to paralyze the
profitable coal industry.' Faced with a growing public outcry for mine
1. Gardiner Harris & Ralph Dunlop, Dust, Deception, and Death: Why Black Lung
Hasn 't Been Wiped Out, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Apr. 19, 1998 (examining the number of

death certificates listing pneumoconiosis as the cause ofdeath), available at http://www.courierjournal.com/dust/. Harris and Dunlop report: "It's as if the Titanic sank every year, and no
ships came to the rescue. While that long-ago disaster continues to fascinate the nation, the
miners slip into cold, early graves almost unnoticed." Id.
2. See ANDREW CHURG & FRANCIS H. Y. GREEN, PATHOLOGY OF OCCUPATIONAL LUNG
DISEASE 134-35 (2d ed. 1998) (discussing in detail the medical aspects of black lung disease

resulting from the inhalation of coal dust).
3. See id. at 139-41 (describing the clinical and pathological features of black lung
disease and noting that "[t]he disease progresses even inthe absence of further dust exposure").
4. See infra Part II.B (describing the tumultuous social underpinnings of the Federal
Black Lung Benefits Program).
5.

See BARBARA ELLEN SMITH, DIGGING OUR OWN GRAVES: COAL MINERS AND THE
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health and safety reforms, 6 Congress established the Federal Black Lung
Benefits Program. 7
The Federal Black Lung Benefits Program, like the disease itself,
often proceeds at a tortuously slow pace because of protracted litigation.8
The major factors contributing to the marathon-like benefits process
include the imbalance in legal resources between coal miners and coal
operators and the mountains of medical evidence presented by each party,
such as X-rays, pulmonary function tests, and arterial blood gas tests.9
Claims are bogged down further by a procedural obsession with accuracy
that allows miners and operators to relitigate many issues.'0 This Note
argues against a recent Seventh Circuit decision that discards finality in
an overzealous pursuit of accuracy."
This Note suggests that the United States Courts of Appeals should
reject the recent Seventh Circuit decision and continue to value finality in
STRUGGLE OVER BLACK LUNG DISEASE 98-99 (1987)

(noting that high prosperity in the coal

industry during the late 1960s established a feeling of job security among miners that led to
"wildcat strikes," work stoppages not sponsored by the United Mine Workers of America that
called for dust controls and black lung disability benefits).
6. See Ben A. Franklin, The Scandal ofDeath and Injury in the Mines, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
30, 1969, reprinted in APPALACHIA INTHE SIXTIES: DECADE OF REAWAKENING 93 (David S.
Walls & John B. Stephenson eds.) (1972) (recounting the national attention directed toward
mine health and safety that followed the disastrous 1968 explosion that killed seventy-eight coal
miners in Consolidation Coal Company's No. 9 mine in Farmington, West Virginia).
7. See Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91173, 83 Stat. 792 (1969) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (2000)) (representing
the first of many laws passed by Congress in developing the Federal Black Lung Benefits
Program).
8. See Old Ben Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 292 F.3d 533, 535
(7th Cir. 2002) (stating that the black lung case before the Seventh Circuit, "like so many other
black lung cases, has a long and tortuous history"); Brian C. Murchison, Due Process,Black
Lung, and the Shaping ofAdministrative Justice, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1025, 1028-1032 (2002)
(describing a black lung benefits claim that remained undecided after twelve years and noting

that this length of adjudication is not uncommon).
9. See Murchison, supra note 8, at 1032 (noting the protracted nature of black lung
claims). Professor Murchison posits that the delay in processing results from:

multiple claims; adversarial proceedings between a corporation with experienced
legal counsel and a coal miner who may or may not be represented; uncertain legal
application of finality doctrines, resulting in re-litigation of virtually every issue;
dominance by the coal operator in producing medical evidence;.., and the stop-

and-start mode of compensating miners at various times in the life of a claim.
Id.

10. See Old Ben, 292 F.3d at 541 (finding a preference for accuracy over finality in
determining black lung benefits awards).
11. See id. (determining that accuracy should always trump finality concerns in
modification adjudications).
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the modification process." One must note that traditional notions of
finality do not apply in the workers' compensation setting because of the
dynamic nature of injury and illness. 13 Any workers' compensation
system must allow for adjustment of awards in accordance with changes

in a worker's condition.

4

However, this flexibility should not become

counterproductive by forcing claimants and operators to continuously
litigate the accuracy of benefits awards or denials. Miners, coal mine
operators, the courts, and society will benefit from a black lung benefits
program that achieves an accurate, yet final resolution in disability
claims.
Part II of this Note discusses the long and intertwined histories of
coal mining and the Federal Black Lung Benefits Program. Part III
describes the modification procedure that claimants and coal operators
may pursue during and after the benefits determination process. Although
Congress intended the modification procedure to allow for the adjustment
of benefits awards in order to account for changes in a miner's condition

or to correct a mistake in a determination of fact, modification often
serves as a sword and a shield for parties hoping to stall and harass their
adversaries. 5 Courts find themselves in the position of balancing two
compelling, but competing equitable values: accuracy and finality.
Courts must remember the United States Supreme Court's admonition
that petitions for modification should be granted only when doing so will
"render justice under the act."'16 In other words, administrative law
12. See id. at 550 (Wood, J., dissenting) (stating that while traditional notions of res
judicata do not apply in the modification process, an ALJ should still consider finality when
deciding whether to reopen a black lung benefits award for modification).
13. See Jessee v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 5 F.3d 723, 725 (4th Cir.
1993) ("[T]he 'principle' of finality just does not apply to Longshore Act and black lung claims
as it does in ordinary lawsuits").
14. See 7 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
§ 127.07[7] (2000) (noting the flexibility inherent in workers' compensation). Larson states:
It is almost too obvious for comment that resjudicata does not apply if the issue is
the claimant's physical condition or degree of disability at two entirely different
times, particularly in the case of occupational diseases. A moment's reflection
would reveal that otherwise there would be no such thing as reopening for a change
in condition.
Id.
15. See Stevens Shipping Co. v. Kinlaw, No. 99-1954, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 31354, at
*9(4th Cir. Dec. 8, 2000) (concerning a claim for Longshore benefits and noting the danger of
allowing modification proceedings merely to allow one party "to get a second chance at
presenting evidence available in the first hearing" because it creates a back-door route for
parties to retry their cases).
16. See O'Keeffe v. Aerojet-Gen. Shipyards, Inc., 404 U.S. 254, 256 (1971) (per curiam)
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judges (ALJs) must weigh the interest in accurate benefits determinations
against the interests of judicial efficiency and finality.1 7 Part IV of this
Note criticizes the Seventh Circuit's decision to discard finality in Old
8
Ben Coal Co. v. Director,Office of Workers' Compensation Programs.'
Part V analyzes the decisions of the United States Courts of Appeals that
value finality in the reopening inquiry. Part VI suggests that ALJs
(stating that administrative law judges possess broad discretion to reopen benefits awards in
order to "render justice under the act").
17. See Bethenergy Mines, Inc. v.Henderson, No. 99-2495,2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 2390,
at * 11-12 (4th Cir. Feb. 16, 2001) (weighing the finality and accuracy interests and stating that
"the paramount interest is in ensuring that eligible claimants receive benefits and that ineligible
claimants do not, and when that interest clashes with an interest in finality, the latter must
yield").
18. See Old Ben Coal Co. v.Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 292 F.3d 533, 547
(7th Cir. 2002) (stating that accuracy should be the paramount interest considered in ALJ
decisions to reopen benefits awards for modification). In Old Ben, the Seventh Circuit
considered whether an ALI applied the correct legal standard when she declined to reopen a
black lung benefits award because doing so would violate principles of finality. Id. at 538. The
claimant, James Hilliard, filed for black lung benefits in 1990. Id. at 535. A claims examiner
initially denied the claim. Id. The Department of Labor (DOL) received additional information
and reversed the decision, granting Mr. Hilliard benefits. Id. at 535-36. The claim proceeded
to the Office of Administrative Law Judges (OALJ), and the presiding ALJ granted benefits. Id.
at 536. The coal operator, Old Ben Coal Company, appealed and then requested dismissal of
the appeal to pursue modification. Id. The district director denied modification, and the
operator requested a hearing. Id. A new ALJ issued an order to show cause why the case
should not be decided on the record. Id. The operator did not file a response and almost a year
passed until April 1995, when the operator informed the ALJ of Mr. Hilliard's death and
requested a remand in anticipation of a survivor's claim. Id. The ALJ granted the request. Id.
Mrs. Hilliard did not file a survivor's claim and the case returned to the OALJ for a hearing. Id.
Mr. Hilliard's estate moved to-have the operator's modification petition decided on the record,
and after receiving no objection from the operator, ALJ Thomas Burke denied its request for
modification. Id. After ALJ Burke denied the modification request, the operator discovered
that its lawyer had abandoned its case. Id. After obtaining new counsel, the operators appealed
the decision denying modification. Id. The Benefits Review Board (BRB) remanded the claim
to the district director who subsequently returned it to the OALJ for a hearing by ALJ Linda
Chapman. Id. at 537. Nine years after Mr. Hilliard's initial claim, ALJ Chapman declined to
reopen the award for modification because "[t]o do so would make mincemeat of any principle
of finality." Id. at 538. The BRB upheld the decision and the operator appealed to the Seventh
Circuit. Id. The Seventh Circuit found that AU Chapman applied the wrong legal standard
when she based her decision not to reopen Mr. Hilliard's benefits award for modification in the
interest of finality. Id. at 548. The Seventh Circuit noted the language of the statute setting
forth the circumstances under which an ALJ may modify an award: a change in circumstances
or mistake in fact. Id. at 539. The Seventh Circuit determined that the Supreme Court
interpreted these terms broadly and that principles of finality do not apply to black lung claims.
Id. at 539-41. It also afforded deference to the DOL's interpretation that accuracy ispreferred
over finality in benefits awards. Id. at 541. The Seventh Circuit remanded the case because it
found that ALJ Chapman applied the wrong legal standard by not giving credence to the
statute's preference for accuracy over finality. Id. at 546.
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examine both accuracy and finality when determining whether reopening
for modification promotes justice.
II. The FederalBlack Lung Benefits Program
A. Background of Coal Mining and Black Lung Disease
Coal, the world's most abundant fossil fuel, permeates the layers of rock
beneath the earth's surface.' 9 Coal reserves in the United States can be mined
profitably for many centuries to come.20 Increased mechanization in the past
forty years improved production output while also reducing the need for coal
miners. 21 However, over 100,000 miners still work in underground and surface
mines in the United States.22
The process of coal formation takes many centuries, as shifting layers of
rock put pressure on seams of peat beneath the earth's surface. 23 Peat mixes
with many elements in the earth's crust during its transformation into coal.24
Some of these elements can cause cancer or have toxic effects on the human
body's cells.25 The process of ripping coal from its subterranean home leaves
millions of tiny coal bits drifting through the confined mine atmosphere where
they mix with other particles, such as ash and silica, to form coal dust. 26 Harm
19. See CHURG & GREEN, supra note 2, at 131 (noting that coal reserves can be found on
almost every continent and that the largest reserves exist in the former Soviet Union and the
United States); LARRY THOMAs, HANDBOOK OF PRACTICAL COAL GEOLOGY 139 (1992) (stating
that the United States, Australia, and South Africa export the top amounts of coal).
20. See CHURG & GREEN, supra note 2, at 131 (reporting that reserves in the United States
contain 396 billion metric tons of coal).
21. See id. at 133 (stating that while productivity increased fivefold since 1950, the
number ofcoal miners steadily declined from a high of441,000 in 1949 to 118,733 in 1992).
22. See DUANE LOCKARD, COAL: A MEMOIR AND CRITIQUE 19-35 (1998) (noting that in
the coal fields of Kentucky, Illinois, and West Virginia, coal mining remains the population's
primary occupation).
23. See D. W. VAN KREVELEN, COAL 42 (1961) (describing the process of coal formation
beginning with the accumulation of wood, bark, roots, and leaves in swampy areas).
24. See CHURG & GREEN, supra note 2, at 131 (identifying the most common inorganic
elements in coal as silicon, aluminum, iron, calcium, sulfur, magnesium, titanium, sodium, and
potassium).
25. See id. (noting that trace elements in coal that may be cytotoxic or carcinogenic in
low amounts include boron, mercury, lead, molybdenum, arsenic, cadmium, antimony, and
selenium).
26. See id. at 134 ("The underground mining environment contains a complex mixture of
suspended particles of various shapes and sizes derived from the coal seam, adjacent rock strata,
and rock dust used to dampen explosions.").
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to the human body occurs when miners inhale suspended, microscopic particles

that can penetrate deep into the alveolar region of the lung.27
Over 170 years ago, physicians began to suspect a link between coal dust
and lung disease.28 The earliest medical description of the disease dates back to
1831, when a Scottish doctor, James Gregory, performed an autopsy on a
patient who worked in a coal mine for over ten years. 29 The patient quit mining
due to shortness of breath and chest pain. 30 Before the patient died, he
developed a severe cough that yielded dark expectorate. 3 1 Dr. Gregory noted
that the patient's lungs were black in color and contained several large, fluidfilled cavities.3 2
Although some physicians suspected a link between coal dust and
respiratory disease,33 most physicians and health officials pointed to silica dust
as the sole cause of respiratory ailments in coal miners. 34 Adding to this major
health misconception, company doctors, with more allegiance to their
employers than to their patients, comprised the main source of healthcare for
most coal miners in the United States.35 Company doctors worked for, and
reported to, the coal operators who frequently owned everything in coal mining
towns from the miners' homes to the general store.36 Company doctors
27. See id. at 135 (stating that coal dust can be classified by particle size into three
categories; particles in the smallest two categories can penetrate deep into the lungs and impinge
on airways and nasal passages).
28. See SMITH, supra note 5, at 4 (stating that the 1831 report by Dr. Gregory, Case of
Peculiar Black Infiltration of the Whole Lungs, Resembling Melanosis, was the first of several
British reports that linked lung disease in coal miners to inhalation of coal dust).
29. See id. at 3 (describing Dr. Gregory's findings of severe lung damage including dark
color, wide-spread disorganization, and large, fluid-filled cavities).
30. See id. (detailing John Hogg's symptoms).
31. See id. (noting Hogg's condition prior to death, including the brackish sputum he
coughed up).
32. See id. at 3-4 (recounting the autopsy findings and that Dr. Gregory and John Hogg
attributed Hogg's lung disease to working in the mines).
33. See id. at 4 (stating that twenty-eight years after Dr. Gregory's report, a Pennsylvania
doctor named John T. Carpenter reported to local health authorities his belief in the link
between inhalation of coal dust and development of respiratory disease).
34. See CHuRG & GREEN, supra note 2, at 129 (stating that the emphasis on silica as the
sole cause of pneumoconiosis resulted from "reports from the anthracite coal fields in eastern
Pennsylvania, where both the prevalence of pneumoconiosis and the silica exposures were high
and ... because CWP [coal workers' pneumoconiosis] and silica were indistinguishable on the
chest radiograph").
35. See SMITH, supra note 5, at 14-15 (stating that coal operators "sought to control the
definition and treatment of medical problems" through a system where "miners were required as
a condition of employment" to pay for the services of physicians who reported directly to the
coal operators).
36. See id. at 15 ("Some companies even turned a small profit from [the company
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frequently ignored, redefined, or concealed the occupational injuries common

among miners in order to satisfy their employers. The operators demanded that
doctors attribute mining injuries and illnesses to the weakness or clumsiness of
individual miners, and not to a lack of mine health and safety measures.3 7 The
company doctors often told coal miners that breathing coal dust did not hurt
them because the body could naturally expectorate carbon and that breathing
coal dust actually helped prevent tuberculosis.3 8 The negligence of company
doctors, combined with the operators' preoccupation with production and
profits rather than safety, fostered a long period of silence about the harmful
to the mischaracterization of the fatal
effects of inhaling coal dust and added
39
lung disease as "miners' asthma.
Recognition of the miners' plight began to emerge in the early 1940s when
British physicians classified pneumoconiosis as a disease separate and distinct
from silicosis. 40 In the 1960s, American physicians finally began to
acknowledge that inhaling coal dust without silica could lead to a serious lung
disease, rather than miners' asthma.41 Confusion concerning the clinical
definition of the disease, coupled with the persistent denial by some authorities
that occupational lung disease among miners actually existed, led to the
medical profession's tardy recognition of black lung disease. 42 Finally, in
physician] arrangement by pocketing five to ten percent of the medical checkoff from miners'
pay.").
37. See id. at 15-16 (drawing a connection between the financial entanglement of
company doctors and coal operators and the tendency of company doctors to downplay the
health problems of coal miners).
38. See ALAN DERICKSON, BLACK LUNG: ANATOMY OF A PUBLIC HEALTH DISASTER 44-47
(1998) (detailing the mischaracterization of the effects of inhaling coal dust, ranging from
producing only minor ailments and conditions easily defeated by the body's natural defenses, to
the view of the coal mine as an "underground sanitarium").
39. See SMITH, supra note 5, at 16-17 (outlining "a conspiracy of silence between
company physicians and their corporate employers" that led to a belief among company doctors
and coal miners that those who became disabled from benign miners' asthma either faked illness
or feared the mines). In effect, "the suffering and disability that attended black lung, thus,
became medically stigmatized signs of psychological duplicity or instability." Id. at 17.
40. See DERICKSON, supra note 38, at 121 (discussing Great Britain's classification of
pneumoconiosis as a disease with symptoms and radiographic distinctions separate from
silicosis).
41. See SMITH, supra note 5, at 25-28 (describing the surge of research, articles, and
seminars examining coal mine-related breathing disorders that culminated in 1967 with an
analysis of data from a large United States Public Health Service study that found 125,000
current and former miners had pneumoconiosis).
42. See id. at 27-30 (discussing the medical community's divergent views on the origin of
black lung disease). Smith discusses two conflicting definitions of the disease. Id. at 27. The
first definition viewed coal dust as the sole agent of the disease "which acted over time in an
essentially mechanical and cumulative fashion to impair lung function." Id. The second
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1968, black lung disease and many other mine health and safety issues
suddenly exploded onto the national agenda due to a single mining accident in
Farmington, West Virginia, that killed seventy-eight mine workers.43
B. The Birth ofBlack Lung Benefits
Even before the tragic disaster in Farmington, West Virginia, coal mining
began to attract attention on a national scale. The soft coal industry grew
profitably in the mid-I 960s due to the Vietnam War, the growing demand for
energy, and relatively good relations between the coal operators and the United
Mine Workers of America (UMWA)." Miners enjoyed a high level of job
security because of the shortage of skilled labor in the Appalachian coal
fields.45 Coal miners realized that strikes posed a powerful threat in a tight
labor market and subsequently became more vocal about mining issues ranging
from health and safety to collective bargaining.46 During this time, groups of
doctors with no ties to mine operators began a campaign to "spread the word
that the inhalation of coal dust causes black lung, a crippling, potentially fatal
occupational disease. 4 7 In January of 1969, West Virginia coal miners who
distrusted the medical establishment, the state legislature, and their own union,
formed the West Virginia Black Lung Association to advocate for dust controls

definition of black lung disease focused on the condition of the miners. Id. at 27-28. This
definition began with the finding that some miners who exhibited breathlessness and impaired
lung functioning would exhibit no signs of disease on chest X-rays. Id. at 28. Physicians
following this definition found a direct correlation between the number of years spent in the
mines and the impairment of lung function. Id. These physicians believed that agents such as
the cytotoxins and carcinogens in the air and dust that miners breathe have harmful effects on
the lungs that do not appear on X-rays. Id. To this day, no medical consensus on black lung
exists and it is possible that "black lung is, in fact, several diseases, some or all of which may be
associated with or aggravated by occupational exposure to dust (and perhaps other substances)."
Id. at 29.
43. See id. at 99 (stating that the explosion in Consolidated Coal Company's No. 9 Mine
on November 20, 1968 launched the black lung movement into the national consciousness and
led Congress to pass the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969-the first of many
federal laws creating the Federal Black Lung Benefits Program).
44. See id.at 98 (noting the profitability of the mining industry following a major strike
and subsequent contract compromise in 1966).
45. See id.
(describing the void left in the skilled labor pool following the retirement of a
large number of World War Il-era coal miners).
46. See id. (examining the volatile undercurrent resulting from the dissatisfaction among
strong minority groups within the UMWA over the 1966 contract compromises).
47. See id. at 98-99 (detailing the grass-roots movement for reform in Appalachian coal
country).
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and to secure compensation for the disabled.4" The Federal Black Lung
Benefits Program owes its creation to the grass-roots efforts of physicians and
miners, states' concerns that black lung claimants would raid their workers'
the federal government
compensation programs, and feelings of regret within
49
decades.
for
miners
coal
of
plight
the
for ignoring
The true catalyst for reform, however, came on November 20, 1968, when
seventy-eight coal miners perished in explosions and fires in Consolidation
Coal Company's No. 9 Mine near Farmington, West Virginia. In the aftermath
of the tragedy at Mine No. 9, a nation horrified by the hopelessness of rescue
efforts and the mournful vigils of distraught widows shifted its attention to
mine health and safety.5° In response, Congress began debating the need for
mine safety standards, including dust controls, and a federal compensation
program for sufferers of black lung disease.5 In 1969, Congress passed the
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act (the 1969 Act).52 Title IV of the
1969 Act established the Federal Black Lung Benefits Program for coal miners
disease and for the
who suffered from total disability resulting from black lung
53
disease.
lung
black
from
died
who
miners
of
dependents

48. See Murchison, supra note 8, at 1044 (describing the Black Lung Association's
protests at West Virginia's state capital and awildcat strike involving more than 40,000 miners).
49. See id. at 1045 (setting forth the factors that resulted in a federal disability program
for sufferers of black lung disease).
50. See SMITH, supra note 5, at 102 (discussing the media frenzy that descended on
Farmington, West Virginia and the interest of a "nation of people celebrating Thanksgiving with
family and friends," riveted to "hopeless" and tragic reports from Mine No. 9).
51. See Murchison, supra note 8, at 1045 (noting the congressional response to mine
health and safety issues).
52. Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173,
83 Stat. 792 (1969) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (2000)).
53. Id.; see 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(b) (2002) (defining "totally disabled"). Section
71 8.204(b)(1) provides the definition of total disability for purposes of Part C claims filed with
the DOL:
A miner shall be considered totally disabled if the irrebuttable presumption
described in § 718.304 applies. If that presumption does not apply, a miner shall
be considered totally disabled if the miner has a pulmonary or respiratory
impairment which, standing alone, prevents or prevented the miner:
(i) From performing his or her usual coal mine work; and
(ii) From engaging in gainful employment in the immediate area of his or her
residence requiring the skills or abilities comparable to those of any employment in
amine or mines in which he or she previously engaged with some regularity over a
substantial period of time.
Id. § 718.204(b)(1).
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C. Statutory Framework of the Black Lung Benefits Act
The responsibility for ensuring workplace safety and compensation for
occupational disease traditionally falls to the states, rather than to the federal
government.5 4 How and why did the federal government become involved in
creating programs and laws regarding issues traditionally reserved for state
governments? The primary answer lies in the inherent dangers of coal
mining."s A series of disasters in the early 1900s led to the creation of the
Bureau of Mines within the Department of the Interior.56 The Bureau of Mines
investigated mining methods and miner safety. 7 A notable disaster in 1951,
which killed 119 miners in West Frankfort, Illinois, led to the passage of a
mandatory Mine Safety Code. 8 Under the Mine Safety Code, Congress, for the
first time, gave federal inspectors the authority to shut down dangerous mines.5 9
Because of overlapping authority with state inspectors, federal inspectors
divided responsibility for mine safety with their state counterparts. 60 Federal
inspectors focused on avoiding large-scale disasters while state inspectors
managed the day-to-day dangers of coal mining. 6'
State workers' compensation programs provided benefits for coal miners
62
who died or suffered an injury in the treacherous confines of the mines.
However, most states, with the exception of Pennsylvania and Alabama, did not
54. See PETER S. BARTH, THE TRAGEDY OF BLACK LUNG: FEDERAL COMPENSATION FOR
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE 2 (1987) (noting that in 1911, Wisconsin and New York became the
first states to enact workers' compensation laws).
55. See id. at 3-4 (discussing the physical risk of harm from both large-scale disasters and
individual incidents).
56. See id. at 6-8 (describing the creation ofthe Bureau of Mines and its evolution into a
body with standard-setting and inspection authority).
57. See id. at 7 (outlining the responsibilities of the Bureau of Mines).
58. See id. (detailing the cooperation between the notorious UMWA president, John L.
Lewis, and the United States Secretary of the Interior leading to an optional Mine Safety Code
in 1947 that did not become mandatory until 1952).
59. See id. at 7-8 (describing the inspection duties of the Bureau of Mines).
60. See id. at 8 (stating that the "shared responsibility of federal and state inspectors
created obvious administrative problems").
61. See id. (noting the informal division of inspection responsibility between state and
federal inspectors).
62. See id. (discussing the importance of workers' compensation benefits to workers in
dangerous occupations). Professor Barth reports statistics compiled by the federal government
that show that during 1969, the year that tensions over black lung benefits in West Virginia
were at their highest, one miner died for every 600 miners employed full time. Id. at 3-4; see
also SMITH, supra note 5, at 137 (noting that the main goal behind the development of workers'
compensation laws was to provide quick, equitable relief to workers, while also limiting tort
liability for employers).
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provide benefits to those disabled by black lung disease.6 ' Denial of black lung
disease's deadly and disabling effects, exemplified by its characterization as
64
miners' asthma, permeated most state workers' compensation programs.
Congress responded to the unavailability of benefits for miners suffering from
black lung disease by passing Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and
Safety Act of 1969 which established the Federal Black Lung Benefits
Program.63
The federal government continues to tweak the program by passing
amendments to the original statute and by promulgating new regulations.66
Following its passage in 1969, Congress amended the statute three times to
adjust the eligibility criteria for black lung benefits.67 In 2000, the Department
of Labor (DOL) amended its regulations governing the majority of issues
surrounding the benefits program. 68 This evolution created a hopelessly
complex system for adjudicating benefits claims with different rules governing
claims filed during different periods of time.6 9 Allen R. Prunty and Mark E.
Solomons argue that "[b]ecause the federal black lung program discriminates
among claimants so significantly, depending solely on the date on which the
claim was filed, the disparate treatment of otherwise similarly situated
70
claimants must seem inexplicable to those who can not obtain an award."
63. See BARTH, supra note 54, at 8-9 (noting that Alabama served a relatively small
number of miners and that Pennsylvania provided black lung benefits under a separate program
with lower benefits than its workers' compensation program).
64. See id. at 8 ("[TIhe widely shared perception was that workers who were disabled or
the survivors of those killed by dust diseases had little or no access to workers' compensation
benefits.").
65. Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173,
83 Stat. 792 (1969) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (2000)).
66. See BARTH, supra note 54, at 33-50 (setting out the legislative framework of the
Federal Black Lung Benefits Program through 1981); id. at 255-62 (providing an early analysis
of the 1981 Amendments); see also Rita A.Massie, Student Work, Modification ofBenefitsfor
Claimants Under the Federal Black Lung Benefits Program, 97 W. VA. L.REV. 1023, 1025-30
(1995) (summarizing the major amendments to the Federal Black Lung Benefits Program).
67. See Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 150 (1972)
(codified as amended inscattered sections of 30 U.S.C.) (making it easier for miners to present a
successful black lung benefits claim). But see Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 198 1, Pub.
L.No. 97-119, Title 11, § 202(a), 95 Stat. 1643, 1643 (198 1) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C.
§ 923(b) (2000)) (increasing the difficulty of establishing eligibility for black lung benefits).
68. See generally Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act
of 1969, as Amended, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,920 (Dec. 20,2000) (codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 718,722,
725, 726, 727) (setting forth the criteria for receiving black lung benefits).
69. See Massie, supra note 66, at 1025 (outlining the benefits process); see also SMITH,
supra note 5, at 179 ("By 1974, mastering the intricate rules governing federal black lung
compensation was an exacting task even for experienced lay advocates.").
70.

See Allen R. Prunty & Mark E. Solomons, The Federal Black Lung Program: Its
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Prunty and Solomons further argue that this "unfair treatment" creates much of
the contentious, repetitious, and seemingly endless litigation commonly found
in so many black lung benefits claims.7' In order to understand why the Federal
Black Lung Benefits Program operates under multiple sets of statutes and
regulations, one must examine its legislative history.
1. Title IV of the FederalCoal Mine Health and Safety Act
Congress passed the 1969 Act to:
provide benefits, in cooperation with the States, to coal miners who are
totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis and to the surviving dependents of
miners whose death was due to such disease; and to ensure that in the future
adequate benefits are provided to coal miners and their dependents in the
event of their death or total disability due to pneumoconiosis.72
Congress hoped the program would ease the burden on coal miners, who did
not generally qualify for benefits for black lung disease under state workers'
compensation programs, by providing temporary assistance to miners suffering
from black lung disease." Title IV divided responsibility for processing black
lung benefits claims between the Social Security Administration (SSA) and the
DOL depending on when the claimant filed for benefits.74 This fissure in the
Federal Black Lung Benefits Program resulted from a funding compromise.
Initially, the federal government assumed responsibility for most "old claims"
(Part B). 75 Then, coal operators assumed liability for a temporary four-year
window (Part C).7 6 Finally, the states took over permanent responsibility by
applying to be federally certified workers' compensation programs.77 At the
Evolution and Current Issues, 91 W. VA. L. REv. 665, 723-24 (1989) (discussing the problems
associated with modification and subsequent claims).
71. See id. at 724 (proposing that a feeling of unfair treatment among unsuccessful
claimants encourages them to file multiple claims).
72. Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173,
§ 401, 83 Stat. 792, 792 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 901 (2000)).
73. SeeH.R. CoN. REP. No. 91-761, at 88-91 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2578, 2603 (1969) (providing background on the purposes and policies behind the Federal Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969).
74. Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173,
§ 401, 83 Stat. 792, 792 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 901 (2000)).
75. Id. §§ 411-14.
76. Id. §§ 421-26.
77. See BARTH, supra note 54, at 36-37 (discussing the division of responsibility for the
payment of claims).
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time, most lawmakers believed that the federal government would handle a

majority of the claims for black lung benefits in the first two years. Thereafter,
only a small number of benefits claims would remain because of new dust
suppression measures in the 1969 Act.78
Part B, "Claims for Benefits Filed on or Before December 31, 1972,"
provided cash benefits to miners totally disabled as a result of pneumoconiosis
and to the surviving dependants of miners who died from the disease. 79 The
SSA administered Part B with funding from general revenues.8 0 Part B covered

miners' claims filed on or before December 31, 1972, as well as widows'
claims filed by that date, or six months after the death of the miner if he died on
or before January 1, 1973.
Congress assisted claimants by providing an
irrebuttable presumption of entitlement if the miner had complicated
pneumoconiosis and by providing two rebuttable presumptions for miners who
had at least ten years of mining work history and either had pneumoconiosis or
died from a respiratory disease.82 Eligible claimants received benefits for life
and the payments
did not vary according to age, earnings, or extent of
83
impairment.
Part C, "Claims for Benefits After December 31, 1972," covered claims
filed on or after January 1, 1973.4 The DOL oversaw the administration of
these claims.85 Part C shifted liability for benefits payments to individual coal
mine operators.86 Eventually, state workers' compensation programs approved

78. See id. at 34-36 (stating that Congress provided for mandatory mine air-quality
sampling and increased availability of respiratory equipment).
79. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, §§ 411-14,83
Stat. 792, 793-95 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 921-25 (2000)).
80.
81.

Id. § 411(a).
Id.§§ 411-14.

82. Id. § 411(c)(1)-(3).
83. See BARTH, supranote 54, at 35 (noting that the Part B benefits administered by the
SSA differed from both traditional models of assistance programs: workers' compensation and
social security). The federal government willingly created liberal Part B benefits for miners
because it anticipated that its liability would be temporary. Id. Under the original legislation,
Part B benefits ended after only two years while under Part C, the states took over from the
DOL after seven years, leaving the federal government merely to certify state compliance with
federal standards. Id. at 34.
84. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, §§ 42 1-26.
85. Id. Theoretically, the DOL would maintain a list of certified state workers'
compensation programs. Id. § 421. However, only a small number of states applied to be
certified and no state ever received certification. BARTH, supra note 54, at 43.
86. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, §§ 422-23, 83
Stat. 792, 796-97 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 932(b) (2000)).
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87
by the Secretary of Labor would assume responsibility for Part C claims.
Only those miners not covered by an approved state program could file a Part C
claim with the DOL.8 ' In processing those claims for black lung benefits not
covered by state workers' compensation, Congress provided that the DOL must
follow the procedural provisions of the Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act (Longshore Act).89

2. The Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972
Part B claims immediately swamped Social Security offices. 90 The SSA

received 350,000 claims in the first two years. 9' Congress and the coal
operators realized that a huge liability awaited coal operators if the rate of new

claims maintained the same pace after Part C went into effect.92 The federal
government also realized that it could not process the bulk of claims in the first
two years of the program because it previously underestimated the number of
claims involving death and disability in years prior to 1969. 9' While the SSA

managed to make determinations in ninety-three percent of the claims filed, it
only awarded benefits to about half of those claimants.94 The large volume of
claims and high rate of denial led to the first set of amendments to Title IV, The
Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 (1972 Amendments).95
The 1972 Amendments extended the dates for filing benefits claims and
broadened the coverage of the Federal Black Lung Benefits Program.96
87.
88.
89.
Act).

Id. § 421.
Id. § 422.
Id.; see also infra notes 167-71 and accompanying text (discussing the Longshore

90. See BARTH, supra note 54, at 37-38 (describing the flood of claims resulting because
many groups, including miner advocates, politicians, and the UMWA, encouraged potential
beneficiaries to file claims).
91. See id. at 38 (stating that "new claims were being filed at the rate of 1,800 a week" in
1971).
92. See Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, § 422(b),
83 Stat. 792, 796 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 932(b) (2000)) (providing that "each such
operator shall be liable for and shall secure the payment of benefits").
93. See BARTH, supranote 54, at 38 (noting that Part B would not be able to deal with all
"old cases" of pneumoconiosis in just two years).
94. See id. at 39 ("Anger and resentment toward the agency by the coal mining
community and their elected representatives over the rate of denials was substantial.").
95. Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 150 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).
96. See Massie, supra note 66, at 1027-28 (outlining the provisions of the 1972
Amendments).
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Congress expanded the definition of total disability,97 included coverage for
surface miners,9 8 and provided for the payment of benefits to survivors of
miners who suffered from total disability due to black lung, regardless of their
cause of death. 99 The federal legislators also included a rebuttable presumption
of entitlement for miners with fifteen years of underground mining experience
and total disability due to respiratory impairment.'00 To further increase the
rate of successful claims, the SSA agreed to promulgate new regulations
revising the medical criteria it used to determine whether a claimant qualified
for benefits.'0 ' However, the DOL02
continued to be bound by the more stringent
procedures of the Longshore Act. 1
3. The Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977 and the Black Lung
Benefits Revenue Act of 1977
While the SSA made strides under the revised laws and regulations (by the
late 1970s, Part B approval was as high as seventy percent), 10 3 the DOL
struggled in its new role as main administrator of the Federal Black Lung
Benefits Program."' 4 Indeed, Professor Peter S. Barth calls the DOL
assumption of administrative responsibility for the benefits program "a disaster
for the agency and the law's supporters."' 5 Professor Barth notes six major
problems that emerged in the DOL's first four years of administration.'0 ° First,
a large volume of claims from "old cases," as opposed to recently budding cases
of black lung disease, continued to accumulate.'0 7 Second, the states did not

97. Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 § 4.
98. Id. § 3(a).
99. Id. § 4(b).
100. Id. § 4(c).
101. See 20 C.F.R. § 410.490 (2003) (setting forth interim rules); see also BARTH, supra
note 54, at 42 (noting the promulgation of a new interim presumption proved significant in
raising the rate of successful claims).
102. See Massie, supranote 66, at 1028 (stating that the regulations followed by the DOL
in administering Part C claims contained "more restrictive medical eligibility regulations").
103. See BARTH, supra note 54, at 44 (noting SSA's success under the interim
presumption).
104. See Prunty &Solomons, supranote 70, at 680 (describing Congress's disapproval of
the DOL's low approval rate and painfully slow claims process).
105. BARTH, supra note 54, at 42.
106. See id.at 42-44 (pointing out the main flaws in the Federal Black Lung Benefits
Program).
107. See id. at 42 (noting that a high volume of cases equaled high costs for the program).
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include black lung disease in their workers' compensation programs.'08 The
failure of states to shoulder their portion of the administration and
compensation burden signaled to Congress that the federal government must
maintain a permanent role in managing the black lung benefits program. 10 9
Third, the parties in the Part C phase exhibited a surprising willingness to
fiercely litigate any and all claims." 0 Unlike Part B, Part C incorporated an
adversarial process."' Coal operators, who now faced financial liability for
benefits, aggressively defended claims and frequently appealed determinations
of responsibility.11 2 Fourth, the DOL paid for benefits more frequently than the
operators."13 In many successful claims, the DOL could not name a responsible
operator, and when it could name a responsible operator, the program required
the DOL to pay (with some hope of recovery) the miner's benefits while the
operator exhausted its appeals. 1 4 Fifth, a massive backlog resulted from the
inexperience of DOL personnel, the high volume of claims, and the adversarial
nature of the parties. ' 5 Finally, the DOL repeated one of the primary sins that
led to the 1972 Amendments:
It boasted an extremely low approval rate of less
16
than ten percent.'

108. See id. at 43 (recounting that few states applied for, and none received, certification).
109. See id. (describing the inevitability of permanent federal participation in the black
lung benefits process).
110. See id. (noting the willingness of operators to appeal benefits awards); see also Jessica
L. Toler, Note, Dead Canaries: The Struggle of Appalachian Miners to Get Black Lung
Benefits, 6 J.GENDER RACE & JUST. 163, 179 (2002) (reporting that claimants "are out-manned,

out-gunned, and out-spent" by coal operators during the benefits process).
111. See BARTH, supra note 54, at 43 (noting that claimants, operators, and even the DOL
face-off against each other at every stage of the Part C process).
112. See id. ("In virtually every instance where adetermination was made that an employer
(or the insurer) should pay compensation, the matter was appealed.").
113. See id. (stating that over two-thirds of benefit awards did not name a responsible
operator).
114. See id. (reporting that the DOL (or the Trust Fund today) pays asuccessful claimant's
benefits while the operator appeals the award). The DOL may recover payments from the
operator once appeals are exhausted and the award is final. However, the new modification
standard imposed on ALJs by the Seventh Circuit may prevent benefits awards from ever
becoming final because modification isperpetually available, thereby preventing the Trust Fund
from recouping payment from operators. See Old Ben Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers'
Comp. Programs, 292 F.3d 533, 541 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating a preference for accuracy over
finality in determining black lung benefits awards).
115. See BARTH, supra note 54, at 43 ("From July 1, 1973 to December 31, 1977, no
determination had been made in about 50,000 of the 123,000 cases filed.").
116. See id. at 44 (noting that while the DOL approval rate settled at only 8%, the SSA
approval rate for Part B claims rose to 70%).
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These breakdowns in the benefits program led to a second set of Title IV
amendments. Congress moved to patch the faults in the program by passing
two concurrent pieces of legislation, the Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of
1977 (Reform Act of 1977)' 7 and the Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of
1977 (Revenue Act of 1977)."18 Congress, in the Reform Act of 1977,
attempted to increase the number of successful claimants for Part C." 9
Through the Revenue Act of 1977, Congress hoped to secure funds for the
mounting expenses of the Federal Black Lung Benefits Program
by creating an
20
excise tax on operators for every ton of coal they produced.1
The Reform Act of 1977 enabled the DOL to set its own medical
standards.' 2' While promulgating these new standards, the DOL could not
evaluate claims by standards more restrictive than the SSA's standards under
the 1972 Amendments. 22 Congress expanded the pool of eligible claimants by
redefining "miner" to include those who worked in and around coal mines or
coal preparation facilities. 23 In addition, the Reform Act of 1977 created a
new presumption of entitlement for the survivors of miners who suffered at
least partial disability from pneumoconiosis, worked for at least twenty-five
years in the mines prior to June 30, 1971, and died prior to March 1, 1978.124
Finally, Congress deleted the provision that eliminated Part C after 1981,
thereby solidifying the DOL's permanent role in managing the Federal Black
Lung Benefits Program and erasing any thoughts that
the states might one day
25
assume sole responsibility for black lung benefits. 1
Congress also addressed mounting funding concerns.126 Once the federal
government realized its continuing responsibility for Part C claims, it turned its
117. Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239, 92 Stat. 95 (1978)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C. and 30 U.S.C.).
118. Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-227, 92 Stat. 11 (1978)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 30 U.S.C.).
119. See BARTH, supranote 54, at 45-50 (noting that the Reform Act of 1977 tried to ease
the burden on miners).
120. See id. at 48-49 (describing the Revenue Act of 1977 which assessed an excise tax on
coal tonnage).
121. Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239, 92 Stat. 95 (1978)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C. and 30 U.S.C.).
122. Id. § 2(c).
123.

Id. § 2.

124. Id. § 3(a).
125. Id. § 7.
126. See BARTH, supra note 54, at 47-48 (noting that although operators and states were
eventually scheduled to accept liability for black lung benefits, the federal government had in
reality paid most benefits awards because of the inability to name responsible operators).
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attention to its increasing liability to beneficiaries. 127 The Revenue Act of 1977
created the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund (Trust Fund). 28 Financing for
the Trust Fund came from a tax paid by coal operators on each ton of coal
produced. 29 The Trust Fund accepted liability for any Part C claim when the
miner's last employment in the mines occurred prior to 1970, thereby making
operators indirectly responsible for the oldest cases.' 30 The Trust Fund also
assumed liability when the DOL could not name a responsible operator or when
the DOL could name a responsible operator, but the operator pursued an appeal
(in the last scenario, the Trust Fund can seek repayment when the award
becomes final or the operator concedes).131
4. The Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981 and the Black Lung
Benefits Revenue Act of 1981
Congress, guided by a conservative administration bent on deregulation of
many government programs, moved to delete many of the claimant-friendly
The Black Lung Benefits
provisions of the first two Title IV amendments.'
Amendments of 1981 (1981 Amendments) eliminated the following three
presumptions which many claimants relied upon to establish eligibility: (1) the
presumption of entitlement for claimants who worked at least ten years in the
mines and died from a respiratory disease;' 33 (2) the presumption of entitlement
for claimants with fifteen years of underground mining experience and total
disability due to respiratory impairment; 34 and (3) the presumption of
127. See id. at 47 ("[A]lmost all payments under the Department of Labor program came
from the U.S. Treasury.").
128. Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-227, § 3,92 Stat. I1, 1215 (1978) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 934 (2000) and adding 26 U.S.C. § 4121

(2000)).
129. See id. § 2 (providing for a tax of $1.10 on each ton of coal sold from underground
mines and atax of $0.55 on each ton of coal sold from surface mines, so long as the tax does not
exceed 4.4% of the selling price).
130.

Id. §3.

131.

Id.

132. See BARTH, supra note 54, at 255-56 (recounting that congressional supporters ofthe
Federal Black Lung Benefits Program feared that the Reagan administration and a Republicancontrolled Senate would shut down the entire program); see also Massie, supra note 66, at
1029-30 ("The 1981 Amendments make it significantly more difficult to establish eligibility for
Black Lung Benefits in claims filed on or after January 1, 1982.").
133. Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-119, § 202(b)(1), 95 Stat.
1643, 1643 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 921(c) (2000)).
134. Id.
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entitlement for the survivors of miners who were at least partially disabled from
pneumoconiosis, worked for at least twenty-five years in the mines prior to
June 30, 1971, and died prior to March 1, 1978.135 The 1981 Amendments also
provided for offsetting black lung benefits by the amount of any earnings
received by the miner. 3 6 The current Federal Black Lung Benefits Program,
which operates 1under
the 1981 Amendments, grants very few black lung
37
awards.
benefits
D. Navigating the Maze.: The Black Lung Benefits Process Today
Applying for federal black lung benefits involves navigating various
statutory frameworks and dense regulations. This labyrinth-like task can
challenge even an experienced practitioner,1 38 not to mention the many coal
miners who try to navigate the system without representation. 139 Claims for
benefits can bounce back and forth between multiple levels of adjudication.
Miners and operators frequently
find themselves in disputes that take years, and
40
even decades, to resolve. 1
To further complicate matters, the statutory framework provides that the
procedural provisions of the Longshore Act govern the processing of black lung
benefits claims.' 4 ' Although the Longshore Act sets forth general guidelines,
regulations promulgated by the DOL govern the specifics of the claims
135. Id.
136. See id. § 203(b) (providing that the SSA may deduct amounts from a miner's benefits
for wages or self-employment income).
137. See Toler, supra note I 10, at 177-78 (noting that only 4% of miners received benefits
awards on the basis of their initial application during the 1990s).
138. See Prunty & Solomons, supra note 70, at 672 (describing the "Byzantine maze of
statutory provisions").
139. See Toler, supra note 110, at 178 (stating that many claimants cannot find
representation because few practitioners are willing to work on claims that may last more than a
decade and have a low chance of succeeding); Ron Nixon, Lawyers Are Few and FarBetween
for Black Lung Plaintiffs, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Nov. 25, 2000, at A9 (attributing
attorneys' unwillingness to work on black lung benefits claims to the obstacles surrounding
payment, which include provisions in the DOL regulations requiring attorneys to receive
payment only from successful awards and the ability of coal operators to contest fee awards).
140. See Toler, supra note 110, at 178 (noting that black lung benefits claims frequently
last as long as twenty years and that many miners die before their claims are finally heard and
decided). For a detailed description of the rigors of pursuing a federal black lung benefits claim,
see Murchison, supra note 8, at 1028-32 (describing the ongoing twelve year battle for coal
miner Harold Terry's benefits).
141. See 30 U.S.C. § 932(a) (2000) (providing for the application of the Longshore Act
provisions in federal black lung benefits claims).
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process. 42 The DOL issued its latest revision to the black lung regulations on
December 20, 2000.143 These regulations apply to all claims filed after January
19, 2001.144
A coal miner applying for black lung benefits must file a claim with a
DOL district director office. 4 The district director develops evidence,
processes the claim, and provides a proposed decision and order. 46 The district
director first gathers the claimant's work history and relevant medical
evidence. 147 Based on the employment information provided by the claimant,
the district director notifies operators facing potential liability.1 4' The district
director then produces a schedule for the submission of evidence, a summary of
findings from the DOL's pulmonary examination of the claimant, and the
district director's preliminary analysis of the evidence. 49 The district director
may then ask for additional evidence, issue a proposed decision and order,
schedule an informal conference, or issue a benefits award to an eligible
claimant if the DOL cannot name a responsible operator.'50 Once the district
director issues a proposed decision and order, the claimant and the responsible
operator have thirty days to request a hearing before the Office of
Administrative Law Judges (OALJ)."'5
If the claimant or the operator files a timely request for hearing, an ALJ
schedules a hearing and conducts a de novo review of the record.' 52 The ALJ
then issues a decision and order containing findings of fact and conclusions of
law based on the evidence presented.153 Either party may request a
reconsideration of the decision.154 After an ALJ issues a denial of a request for
reconsideration, or a revised decision and order, either party may then appeal
the decision to the Benefits Review Board (BRB).'"5
142. 20 C.F.R. §§ 718, 725 (2003).
143. Id.
144. Id. § 725.2(c).
145. Id. § 725.303.
146. See id. §§ 725.401-725.420 (outlining the procedures for adjudication of claims
before the district director).
147.

Id. §§ 725.404, 725.405.

Id. § 725.407.
149. Id. § 725.410.
150. Id. § 725.415.
151. Id. § 725.419.
148.

152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. §§ 725.451,725.454.
Id. §§ 725.476, 725.477.
Id. § 725.480.
Id. § 725.481.
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Parties must make specific claims of legal or factual error in the ALJ's
decision to properly invoke review by the BRB because the BRB may not
engage in de novo review. 56 The BRB must determine whether substantial
evidence in the record, considered as a whole, supports the ALJ's findings of
fact and conclusions of law. 5 7 If the ALJ's decision is rational, supported by
substantial evidence, and in accordance with law, the BRB will affirm.' The
claimant, the operator, or the Director of the Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs (as designee for the Secretary of Labor) may seek review of a BRB
decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit where the injury
occurred. 159 The last avenue for appeal lies in the United States Supreme
Court, which either party may petition for a writ of certiorari.
III. Modification
In addition to the multiple opportunities for reconsideration and appeal
within the claims process, the claimant and the operator may request
modification of an award or denial of benefits.'60 The ALJ,"in order to render
justice under the act," 161 may reopen a benefits award for modification to
account for a change in the claimant's condition or to correct a mistake in a
determination of fact. 162 The petition for modification remains part of the
original benefits claim and is not considered a new claim. 63 Miners may
petition for modification at any time within one year of the denial of their
claim. 64 Coal operators may petition for modification within one year of the
date of their last payment of benefits.' 65 After the ALJ issues a modification
156. Id. §802.301.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. § 802.410.
160. Id. § 725.310. For a detailed description of how modification works in the federal
black lung benefits system, see Massie, supra note 66, at 1037-43 (outlining the modification
procedures and introducing various issues involving modification).
161. See Banks v. Chi. Grain Trimmers Ass'n, 390 U.S. 459, 464 (1968) (quoting the
legislative history that explains the rationale behind the 1934 amendment to section 22 of the
Longshore Act that broadened the grounds on which a deputy commissioner (ALJ today) may
modify a benefits award); see also O'Keeffe v. Aerojet-Gen. Shipyards, Inc., 404 U.S. 254,256
(1971) (per curiam) (allowing modification based on re-evaluation of the cumulative evidence
and refusing to restrict modification to cases presenting new evidence).
162. See 33 U.S.C. § 922 (2000) (setting forth the requirements for modification).
163. 20C.F.R. § 725.310(a)(2003).
164. Id.
165. Id.
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decision, either party may take advantage of the full reconsideration and
appeals process.'6
Congress wove modification into the Federal Black Lung Benefits
Program when it incorporated the Longshore Act provisions into the 1969
Act. 167 The Longshore Act required inclusion of the modification process
because longshoremen and harbor workers frequently sustain injuries that either
worsen or heal over time.'
The modification process allows for the
adjustment of benefits awards with respect to a claimant's changing
condition.169 One longshoreman may recover from injuries or adapt so that he
no longer suffers from a disability. On the other hand, another longshoreman
may initially compensate for an injury well enough to continue employment,
only to experience a worsening of his condition to the point of total
disability. 70 Modification creates flexibility to make appropriate benefits
determinations by accounting for a claimant's changing condition.' 7' However,
this flexibility does not always make procedural sense for successful black lung
claimants. Sufferers of black lung disease who qualify for federal benefits have
no hope of recovering lung function. 7 2 Therefore, with regard to a successful
black lung claimant, the provision of a modification petition based on a change
of condition does not take into account the incurable nature of black lung
disease. Modification does, however, play an important role for unsuccessful
claimants.
Within one year of the denial of his claim, a claimant may petition the ALJ
for modification by demonstrating a change in condition sufficient to establish

166. See Massie, supra note 66, at 1040 (describing the levels of review available for
decisions on petitions for modification).
167. See 30 U.S.C. § 932(a) (2000) (stating that the provisions of the Longshore Act

govern the processing of federal black lung benefits claims).

168. See O'Keeffe v. Aerojet-Gen. Shipyards, Inc., 404 U.S. 254, 255-56 (1971) (per
curiam) (noting that ALJs possess broad authority to modify benefits awards).
169. See 33 U.S.C. § 922 (2000) (providing for modification based on a change in
condition).
170. See Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 515 U.S. 291,293-94 (1995) (analyzing a case
where a longshoreman learned to operate a crane after injuring his back and leg), vacated by
Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs v. Rambo, 515 U.S. 1139 (1995), vacated by Metro.
Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121 (1997).
171. See 33 U.S.C. § 922 (2000) (allowing ALJs to open modification on their own
initiative or at the request of any party).
172. See Labelle Processing Co. v. Swarrow, 72 F.3d 308, 314 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that
"pneumoconiosis is a latent dust disease" with a "perniciously progressive nature"); Orange v.
Island Creek Coal Co., 786 F.2d 724, 727 (6th Cir. 1986) (noting the progressive nature of
black lung disease).
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eligibility for black lung benefits. 73 In order to warrant a hearing on
modification, the claimant need only submit enough evidence to show a
possibility of error in the initial benefits award. 74 The change need not be
great, it only must be perceivable. 75 Once the process moves to a hearing, the
claimant must establish that the perceivable change in condition results in the
claimant's total disability due to black lung disease, thereby entitling him to
benefits. 176 A claimant demonstrating eligibility based on a change
77 in condition
will receive benefits that reach back to the date of the change. 1
Claimants and operators also may petition for modification to correct a
mistake in a determination of fact. 78 The Supreme Court gives ALJs broad

173. 20 C.F.R. § 725.310(a) (2003). While operators technically may also allege achange
(an improvement) in the miner's condition, in reality this option should not be available for
operators. Congress intended modification to provide flexibility in the Longshore Act setting
because the injuries and earning potential of harbor workers can be dynamic. See supra notes
167-71 and accompanying text (describing modification inthe Longshore Act). This is not the
case for a successful black lung claimant. Black lung disease is a progressive breathing disorder
that leads to heart failure, pneumonia, respiratory failure, and other complications. See BARTH,
supra note 54, at 57-61 (describing the effects of black lung disease). To qualify for black lung
benefits, the claimant must show that he suffers from pneumoconiosis, that the disease results
from working ina coal mine, that the claimant is totally disabled, and that the disability directly
results from pneumoconiosis. 20 C.F.R. §§ 718.201-718.204 (2003). Ifa miner can meet these
four criteria and receive benefits, he likely suffers from an incurable form of pneumoconiosis.
See BARTH, supra note 54, at 60 (noting that black lung disease which is severe enough to
establish eligibility for federal benefits usually remains incurable). The operator cannot
realistically argue for modification on the basis of a change in condition. The operator must
allege a mistake of fact to successfully petition for modification. See 33 U.S.C. § 922 (2000)
(limiting the grounds for modification to mistake of fact or change inconditions). An operator's
petition for modification of a successful benefit award based solely on a change in the miner's
condition would amount to little more than an additional and unnecessary opportunity for the
operator to contest its liability for benefits. But see Prunty & Solomons, supra note 70, at 72122 (arguing that a miner's petition for modification based on a change inconditions should be
barred unless the miner inhaled additional dust because he continued or returned to coal
mining).
174. See 20 C.F.R. § 725.310(a) (2003) (stating that the district director may reconsider an
award or denial of benefits at the request of either party or upon his or her initiative).
175. See Amax Coal Co. v. Franklin, 957 F.2d 355,356 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that in the
modification process, the required change in condition need only be perceptible, and not
material).
176. See id. (noting that although the regulations only require a perceptible change in
condition to warrant reopening, the claimant must still make a showing of entitlement upon
reopening); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.201-725.205 (2003) (outlining the requirements
claimants must meet to receive federal black lung benefits).
177. See Jarka Corp. v. Hughes, 299 F.2d 534, 536-37 (2d Cir. 1962) (discussing the
retroactive nature of benefits awards granted in a modification procedure).
178. See 33 U.S.C. § 922 (2000) (setting forth the requirements for modification).
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discretion to correct a "mistake in a determination of fact."' 179 In O 'Keeffe v.
Aerojet-GeneralShipyards, Inc., o the Court found that ALJs possess broad
discretion to correct mistakes of fact "whether demonstrated by wholly new
evidence, cumulative evidence, or merely further reflection on the evidence
initially submitted."' 3 ' Therefore, a claimant or operator may petition for
modification by simply asserting that the ALJ decided the ultimate question of
fact incorrectly-whether the claimant is disabled due to pneumoconiosis
attributable to his working in the mines.8 2 Either party may simply ask the
ALJ to reflect further on the initial evidence and find in the moving party's
favor.' 83 An AD will evaluate any new evidence presented, along with the
evidence presented in the original claim, to determine whether a mistake of fact
84
exists and, if so, whether it necessitates modification of the benefits award.
A successful petition entitles the miner to retroactive benefits beginning with
the date when he originally began suffering from total disability.' 85
If the Supreme Court provides ALJs with broad discretion to reopen
claims for modification, under what circumstances may ALJs deny petitions for
modification? While the Court's case law does not address this question
179. See Betty B Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 194 F.3d 491,497
(4th Cir. 1999) ("This modification procedure is extraordinarily broad, especially insofar as it
permits the correction of mistaken factual findings.").
180. O'Keeffe v. Aerojet-Gen. Shipyards, Inc., 404 U.S. 254 (1971) (per curiam). In
0 'Keeffe, the Supreme Court considered whether modifications based on amistake of fact must
rely on new evidence. Id. at 255. The DOL denied a claimant benefits because the claimant
failed to prove that disability resulted from his employment. Id. at 254. The claimant moved to
reopen and presented testimony from his personal physician. Id. The DOL reversed the prior
decision and awarded benefits. Id. The Fifth Circuit reversed because "in the absence of
changed conditions or new evidence clearly demonstrating mistake in the initial determination,
the 'statute simply does not confer authority upon the Deputy Commissioner to receive
additional but cumulative evidence and change his mind."' Id. at 254-55. The Supreme Court
reversed. Id. at 256. The Court analyzed the legislative history of the Act and found that
Congress vested deputy commissioners (ALJs) with broad discretion to correct mistakes of fact.
Id. Modification does not require new evidence and deputy commissioners may justify
reopening by merely reflecting on the evidence previously submitted. Id.
181. Id. at 256.
182. See Jessee v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 5 F.3d 723, 726 (4th Cir.
1993) ("If a claimant avers generally that the ALJ improperly found the ultimate fact and thus
erroneously denied the claim, the [ALJ] has the authority, without more, to modify the denial of
benefits.").
183. See 0 'Keeffe, 404 U.S. at 256 (stating that an ALJ's discretion allows her to reopen
and modify cases merely upon rethinking the previously submitted evidence).
184. 20C.F.R. § 725.310(a)(2003).
185. See Jarka Corp. v. Hughes, 299 F.2d 534, 536-37 (2d Cir. 1962) (noting that benefits
awarded upon a mistake of fact may reach farther back than benefits awarded upon a change of
conditions).
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directly, the federal circuits rely heavily on the Court's directive that ALJs
"render justice under the act." 186 Most federal circuits find that this generous
grant of discretion gives ALJs freedom to consider two main factors: accuracy
and finality. 187 However, some circuits interpret the Court's support of broad,
substantive criteria for modification as a preference for accuracy over finality in
benefits awards. 8 These circuits mandate that an ALJ may not deny a petition
for modification solely in the interest of finality.' 8 9 The Seventh Circuit
recently addressed the value of finality in petitions for modification and found
that "finality simply is not a paramount concern of the Act."' 90
IV. The Seventh Circuit DiscardsFinality in Old Ben Coal Co. v. Director,
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
True to the pedigree of most black lung claims, a long and complex
procedural history accompanied the operator's petition to the Seventh Circuit in
Old Ben.' 9' The case arrived before the Seventh Circuit after the operator
appealed the ALJ's denial of its petition for modification.' 92 The operator
claimed that the ALU did not apply the correct legal standard when she found
that reopening James Hilliard's benefits award would not "renderjustice under
the act."' 93
186. See O'Keeffe v. Aerojet-Gen. Shipyards, Inc., 404 U.S. 254, 256 (1971) (giving AUs
broad discretion to correct factual errors).
187. See infra notes 286-90 and accompanying text (noting the various circuits that value
accuracy and finality in the reopening inquiry).
188. See Bethenergy Mines, Inc. v. Henderson, No. 99-2495,2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 2390,
at * 10-12 (4th Cir. Feb. 16, 2001) (finding that ALJs should ground their analysis inpromoting
accuracy, not finality or res judicata, when evaluating modification petitions); Consolidation
Coal Co. v. Worrell, 27 F.3d 227,230 (6th Cir. 1994) ("Once a request for modification is filed,
no matter the grounds stated, if any, the deputy commissioner has the authority, if not the duty,
to reconsider all the evidence for any mistake of fact or change in conditions."); Jessee v. Dir.,
Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 5 F.3d 723, 725 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating that traditional
notions of finality do not apply in Longshore and black lung benefits claims).
189. See Bethenergy Mines, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 2390, at *11-12 ("In modification
cases, the paramount interest is in ensuring that eligible claimants receive benefits and that
ineligible claimants do not, and when that interest clashes with an interest in finality, the latter
must yield.").
190. See Old Ben Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 292 F.3d 533,546
(7th Cir. 2002) (analyzing the proper legal standard that ALJs should apply when evaluating
petitions for modification).
191. See supra note 18 (detailing the procedural history of Old Ben).
192. See Old Ben, 292 F.3d at 538 (noting that the AJ declined to reopen because "[t]o do
so would make mincemeat of any principles of finality").
193. See id. at 538-40 (discussing the operator and the DOL's arguments).
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The operator petitioned for modification after it discovered that its
attorney abandoned his law practice and did not provide for the operator's
physicians to evaluate Mr. Hilliard's autopsy report. 94 Prior to the hearing on
modification, Mrs. Hilliard refused to comply with the operator's request to
allow its physician to view her husband's autopsy material. 95 The ALJ denied
the operator's request for an order directing Mrs. Hilliard to authorize
evaluation of the autopsy material because she determined that Mrs. Hilliard
had no duty to cooperate with the operator in its attempt to reverse the benefits
award. 96 The ALJ found that the operator's counsel knew of Mr. Hilliard's
197
death three years ago and the availability of the autopsy report at that time.
After a hearing, the ALJ denied the operator's petition for modification because
to grant it would not render justice under the Act, noting that "[m]odification is
discretionary, not automatic. "'98 Allowing modification by the operator in this
claim would allow it to retry its case on the basis of evidence it should have
presented at prior hearings.' 99 The ALJ stated that to permit modification in
this context would "make mincemeat of any principles of finality" by
encouraging operators to contest awards year after year simply on the basis of
re-evaluations of previously submitted medical evidence. 0 0
The operator argued that the ALJ applied an erroneous standard when
evaluating its petition for modification.'
Specifically, the operator claimed
that the ALJ imposed an impermissible threshold requirement when she stated
that she would reopen the award for modification only if doing do would render
justice under the Act.20 2 The operator asserted that the statute and regulations
194. See Petitioner's Brief and Short Appendix at 14, Old Ben Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of
Workers' Comp. Programs, 292 F.3d 533 (7th Cir. 2002) (No. 00-3222) (arguing that the
disappearance of one's counsel presents reasonable and proper grounds for modification) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
195. See id. at 7 (noting Mrs. Hilliard's refusal to authorize the operator's review of her
husband's autopsy slides).
196. See Old Ben Coal Co. v.Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 292 F.3d 533, 537
(7th Cir. 2002) (discussing the ALJ's order to deny the operator's request to order Mrs. Hilliard
to authorize examination of her husband's autopsy slides).
197. See id. (noting the autopsy slides' availability at the time of Mr. Hilliard's death).
198. Id.
199. See id. (observing that the AU refused to allow the operator "to retry its case simply
because it feels that it can make a better showing the next time around").
200. See id. at 538 (analyzing the inequity in forcing successful claimants to repeatedly
defend their awards against operators with greater resources).
201. See id. at 539 (advocating a broader view of reopening for modification).
202. See Petitioner's Brief and Short Appendix at 16, Old Ben Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of
Workers' Comp. Programs, 292 F.3d 533 (7th Cir. 2002) (No. 00-3222) (arguing against the
ALJ's application of a "render justice under the act" threshold requirement in modification
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did not require this and that they in fact provided broad grounds for either party
to seek modification.20 3 The operator also argued that although Congress gave

ALJs broad discretion to account for changes in condition and to correct
mistakes of fact, Congress did not intend for ALJs to have standardless
discretion to deny modification.2°4 Congress intended ALJs to deny reopening

only when the party seeking modification could not point to any relevant
mistakes or changed conditions. °5 Finally, the operator alleged that even if the
threshold inquiry proved appropriate, the ALJ erroneously found that 2an
06
employer's modification request would never render justice under the Act.
The operator pointed out that any party may seek modification and that the20"Act
7
does not and cannot treat the parties differently based on their identity.
The DOL also filed a brief as a party in interest. The DOL noted the
permissive nature of modification and argued that petitions for modification
should not be denied solely because the party seeking modification could have
presented its supporting evidence at an earlier hearing. 208 The DOL asserted

that ALJs should deny timely petitions for modification only if the party
seeking modification previously engaged in reprehensible conduct.20 9 The
DOL claimed that the Federal Black Lung Benefits Program prefers accuracy
over finality and does not allow erroneous benefits awards to continue simply to

further finality.210

petitions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
203. See id. at 16-19 (claiming that nothing in the statues, regulations, or case law
concerning modification requires a "rendering justice" threshold inquiry).
204. See id. at 18-19 (arguing that the use of the word "may" in 33 U.S.C. § 922 (2000)
does not give open-ended authority to ALJs to decide modification petitions according to
personal beliefs and preferences).
205. See id. ("A more logical and reasonable reading of the word 'may' suggests that the
adjudicator has the discretion to respond only to material and relevant mistakes or changed
conditions and ignore irrelevant or immaterial mistakes or changes.").
206. See id. at 19-20 (claiming that the ALJ's finding that employer modifications will
never render justice under the act was "arbitrary and an abuse of discretion").
207. Id. at 20.
208. See Brief of the Federal Respondent at 8, Old Ben Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of
Workers' Comp. Programs, 292 F.3d 533 (7th Cir. 2002)(No. 00-3222) (noting that the flexible
nature of modification precludes ALJs from denying petitions for modification solely because
the moving party did not present its evidence earlier) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
209. See id. at 19 (arguing that employers not engaged in contemptible conduct can take
full advantage of the modification statute's generous provisions).
210. See id. at 15 (noting that modification encourages correction, and not perpetuation, of
mistakes).
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Mrs. Hilliard argued that the ALJ's threshold inquiry represented an
appropriate exercise of ALJ discretion.' She noted that appellate courts afford
great discretion to a trial judge's evaluations of the "interest ofjustice" criterion
in a variety of settings including criminal law and bankruptcy. 12 According to
her arguments, the operator and DOL misplace their concern for arbitrary
decision-making because "where a render justice finding is questionable, the
losing party's recourse is the appellate process, not a restriction on
discretion. 213
Mrs. Hilliard argued that the ALJ properly denied the operator's petition
because the operator ignored the opportunity to develop and present evidence at
a prior hearing. 4 Mrs. Hilliard asserted that modification should not be used
to correct prior mistakes in litigation.2 15 Allowing modification to save a
16
litigant from his counsel's mistakes does not serve the interests of justice.
Congress intended modification to allow for the correction of mistakes in
determinations of fact, not to correct mistakes by a party's counsel.2 1 7 The
claimant argued that "[a]pproval of such tactics would only add to the already
prolonged litigation which is the unfortunate trademark of federal black lung
21 8
claims.
Mrs. Hilliard also noted that the operator misread the ALU's decision when
it claimed the ALJ determined that employer modifications can never render
justice under the Act.2 '9 The ALJ reviewed and analyzed the history of the

211. See Brief for Claimant-Respondent at 16-19, Old Ben Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of
Workers' Comp. Programs, 292 F.3d 533 (7th Cir. 2002) (No. 00-3222) (presenting compelling
authority for the AU's threshold inquiry) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
212. See id. at 19-20 (discussing the generous deference afforded to hearing officers in
many settings incorporating the "interest ofjustice" criterion, such as criminal law, bankruptcy,
and procedural issues including grants of new trial, severance, and transfer of venue in the
federal courts).
213. See id. at 20-21 (noting that Congress granted ALJs great deference because of their
expertise in trial issues and their ability to spend more time with a case than trial judges).
214. See id.
at 21 ("Section 22 does not permit modification of an award to save litigants
from their counsel's mistakes but instead is limited to actual mistakes of fact.").
215. See id. (arguing that modification should not be used to correct an attorney's error
regarding the presentation of evidence).
216. See id. (stating that a party may not use modification to simply retry its case).
217. See id. at 22 (pointing to the language of33 U.S.C. § 922 (2000), which provides for
modification based on a mistake in a determination of fact).
218. Id. at 21-22.
219. See id. at 25 (arguing that the AU gave adequate consideration to the operator's
motion and based her determination on the facts before her, not upon an opinion ofthe inequity
of employer modifications).
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claim, the grounds for the award, and the operator's argument.220 Mrs. Hilliard
asserted that the ALJ held that reopening would not render justice under the
Act in this claim, and not the broader proposition that operator modifications
can never render justice. 22' The ALJ did not make any overarching
determinations regarding operators in general.222 Mrs. Hilliard argued that the
Seventh Circuit should uphold the AL's determination because the ALJ gave
due consideration to all the evidence and facts presented at the hearing and in
the prior record.223
A panel of the Seventh Circuit examined the Supreme Court's broad
interpretation of "change in condition" and "mistake of fact. 2 24 The court of
appeals also noted the generous time line for requesting modification and the
lack of a specific limit on the number of modification petitions a party may
file. 2 5 In light of Supreme Court case law granting ALJs wide discretion to
reopen benefits awards and the generous time limit provisions of the
modification statute, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the DOL that AU
evaluations of modification petitions should focus on accuracy, and not on
finality. 226 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit determined that the ALJ had applied
the wrong legal standard when she denied the operator's petition for
modification on the basis of finality concerns. 227 The Seventh Circuit voted

220. See id. at 24 (pointing to the AU decisions on discovery requests and the provision of
a hearing on modification).
221. See id. (stating that the ALJ based her decision "on the facts of the case, established
legal principles and rational decision-making").
222. See id. (providing that the ALJ did not "summarily dismiss" the operator's claim).
223. See id. at 26 (noting an AL's discretionary power to reject late evidence).
224. See 33 U.S.C. § 922 (2000) (providing that an ALJ may grant modification "on the
ground of a change in conditions or because of a mistake in a determination of fact"); Old Ben
Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 292 F.3d 533, 539 (7th Cir. 2002)
(interpreting the circumstances under which an AU may modify an award); O'Keeffe v.
Aerojet-Gen. Shipyards, Inc., 404 U.S. 254, 256 (971 ) (per curiam) (stating that Aids possess
great discretion to reopen benefits awards in order to "render justice under the act").
225. Old Ben, 292 F.3d at 540; see also 33 U.S.C. § 922 (2000) (setting the time limit for
modification at one year after the denial of an award or one year after the last payment of
benefits).
226. See Old Ben, 292 F.3d at 542 n.8 (analyzing the proper amount of deference to give
the DOL's interpretation of AU discretion to deny petitions for modification). As the Seventh
Circuit stated, "[W]e need not decide precisely the level of deference that should attach to the
DOL's interpretation of the statute and implementing regulations; its position, we believe, is
both reasonable and persuasive. Regardless of the precise standard of deference applied,
therefore, we would uphold the DOL's interpretation." Id.
227. See id. at 548 (finding that accuracy should be the paramount concern in
modification).
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under a standard
two-to-one to remand the claim for further consideration
28
holding accuracy, and not finality, paramount.Z
V. The Federal Circuits Value Finality in the Reopening Inquiry
The Old Ben holding errs by worshiping at the alter of accuracy and
removing finality from the "render justice under the act" inquiry.22 a The
Seventh Circuit instructs ALJs that unless they can point to some abusive
conduct by the party seeking modification, the ALJ cannot deny the
petition for modification. The Seventh Circuit effectively narrows
Congress's broad grant of discretion to ALJs to evaluate whether
reopening
a benefits award for modification will render justice under the
0
Act.

23

A. The Sixth Circuit
In its analyses, the Seventh Circuit pointed to the Sixth Circuit's
practice of discarding finality in the reopening inquiry. The court
repeatedly quoted Consolidation Coal Company v. Worrell23 for the
proposition that ALJs may only deny modification in limited
circumstances.232 The Consolidation Coal court stated that "[o]nce a
request for modification is filed, no matter the grounds stated, if any, the
228. See id. (remanding the claim for further consideration under the accuracy standard).
229. See id. at 547 (discussing when an AU may properly deny a modification petition).
230. See id. at 550-51 (Wood, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress gave ALJs broad
discretion).
23 1. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Worrell, 27 F.3d 227, 230 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding that
ALJs possess broad discretion to reopen benefits awards, even when the petition does not
formally aver a change in condition or mistake in fact). InConsolidationCoal, the Sixth Circuit
considered whether the DOL properly treated a miner's second claim for benefits under the
modification provisions. Id. at 228. The miner filed the second claim within one year of his
initial denial. Id. However, he did not specifically aver that the A.J made a mistake in a
determination of fact or that a change occurred in his condition. Id. at 230. The employer
argued that inorder to invoke modification, the party seeking modification must make a specific
claim of mistake in fact or change in conditions. Id. The court noted that ALJs possess broad
discretion to reopen benefits awards, including the discretion to simply rethink the ultimate
determination on eligibility. Id. Therefore, the court found that the miner did not have to make
a specific claim of mistake of fact or change in conditions and the DOL properly treated the
second claim under the modification provisions. Id.
232. See Old Ben Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 292 F.3d 533, 541
(7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Consolidation Coal to demonstrate a preference for accuracy over
finality in modification).
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deputy commissioner has the authority, if not the duty, to reconsider all
233
the evidence for any mistake of fact or change in conditions."
However, the Seventh Circuit picked this language out of Consolidation
Coal without examining the context of the case. Consolidation Coal
involved a miner's claim filed less than one year after his initial denial.2 34
The miner did not specifically assert a change in condition or a mistake
of fact. 235 The Sixth Circuit held that the ALJ properly treated the claim
as a petition for modification and refused to adopt the operator's position
that a petition for modification must specifically state its basis in a
change of condition or mistake of fact. 3 6
ConsolidationCoal stands for the proposition that the DOL does not
require a party seeking modification to specifically plead a mistake of
fact or change in condition. 237 This holding is consistent with O 'Keeffe,
which allows ALJs to simply rethink benefits awards. 238 However,
Consolidation Coal did not suggest that reopening must be automatic.
Indeed, the Sixth Circuit noted in Consolidation Coal that ALJs retain
the power to determine when reopening would render justice under the
Act. 239 The court stated that the ALJ "may, if he chooses, accept this
contention [that the benefits award contains error] and modify the final
order accordingly. 2 40 Additionally, two years after ConsolidationCoal,
the Sixth Circuit stated that "[m]odification is not automatic, but
discretionary" and that ALJs "must balance the need to render justice
against the need for finality in decision-making. 2 4 Therefore, the Old
Ben decision mistakenly relied on Consolidation Coal because the Sixth
Circuit expressly recognizes an ALJ's discretion to grant or deny
modification requests based on interests of finality.
233.

Consolidation Coal, 27 F.3d at 230.

234. See id. at 228 (outlining the background of the claim).
235. See id. at 228-29 (noting that the BRB considered the claim a petition for
modification and not a subsequent claim).
236. See id. at 230 (declining to require claimants to specifically assert a change of
condition or mistake).
237. See id. (stating that a party need only allege error in the ultimate finding to request
modification).
238. See O'Keeffe v.Aerojet-Gen. Shipyards, Inc., 404 U.S. 254,256 (1971) (per curiam)
(finding that modification can challenge the ultimate finding of liability).
239. See Consolidation Coal Co. v. Worrell, 27 F.3d 227,230 (6th Cir. 1994) (recognizing
that ALJs possess great discretion in granting or denying modification petitions).
240. Id. at 230 (emphasis added).
241. York v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, No. 95-3555, 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 24016, at *10 (6th Cir. 1996).
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B. The Fourth Circuit

In a series of decisions dating back to 1993, the Fourth Circuit addressed
when an ALJ may properly deny a petition for modification.242 However, the
circuit's answer remains unclear. The court considered the denial of a coal
miner's request for modification in Jessee v. Director, Office of Workers'
CompensationPrograms.1 3 The ALJ denied the miner's request because he
found that one ALJ may not correct a mistake made by another ALJ. 244 The
Fourth Circuit ruled that the ALJ interpreted his authority too narrowly. 245 In
support, the court noted that O 'Keeffe granted ALJs almost "limitless" authority
to reopen benefits awards. 46 During the appeal, the employer argued that the
ALJ's denial should stand because to permit modification would "abrogate the
principle of finality of judicial determinations. 247 The Fourth Circuit
responded to this argument by stating that "the 'principle of finality' just does
not apply to Longshore Act and black lung claims as it does in ordinary
lawsuits." 248 The majority in Old Ben quotes this language to support its
242. See Bethenergy Mines, Inc. v. Henderson, No. 99-2495,2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 2390,
at * 11 (4th Cir. Feb. 16, 2001) (establishing that accuracy should trump finality in modification
determinations); Stevens Shipping Co. v. Kinlaw, No. 99-1954, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 31354,
at *9 (4th Cir. Dec. 8,2000) (finding that finality remains a valuable factor in preventing parties
from abusing the modification procedure); Jessee v.Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 5
F.3d 723, 725 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating that finality does not apply to modification like it does in
other settings).
243. See Jessee, 5 F.3d at 725 (finding that finality does not restrict ALJs from granting
timely petitions for modification). In Jessee, the Fourth Circuit considered whether ALJs have
the authority to correct mistakes of fact made by another ALJ. Id. at 724. The miner petitioned
for benefits and presented an X-ray demonstrating qualifying values for black lung disease. Id.
The first ALJ denied the miner's petition citing the absence of any pulmonary evidence
demonstrating black lung. Id. The miner filed a petition for modification based on the ALJ's
mistaken determination regarding the lack of pulmonary evidence. Id. A second ALJ denied
the petition, citing a lack ofauthority to correct a mistake made by another AL. Id. The miner
appealed, arguing that ALJs possess broad authority to reopen benefits awards to correct errors.
Id. at 725. The employer argued that principles of finality should prevent the ALJ from
reviewing the prior denial. Id. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, finding that finality does not apply
to black lung claims the same way it does in other disputes. Id. The court noted that Congress
allowed ALJs to reopen benefits awards to correct errors based on little or no evidence. Id.
Therefore, finality does not prevent an ALJ from correcting amistake of fact whether made by
herself or another AL. Id. at 726.
244. See id. at 724 (citing the ALJ's reluctance to review another ALJ's decision).
245. See id. at 725 (noting that the broad grant of discretion to ALJs necessitates a broad
reading of their authority to reopen benefits awards).
246. See id. at 724 (quoting the Supreme Court's language inOKeefe v.Aerojet-General
Shipyards, Inc., 404 U.S. 254, 256 (1971) (per curiam)).
247. Id. at 725.
248. Id.
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conclusion that an ALJ may not deny a petition for modification in the interest
of finality. 249 Clearly, however, the Fourth Circuit found that finality does not
restrict ALJs from granting timely petitions for modification.250 The court does
not state that ALJs never can consider finality when exercising their discretion
to deny a modification request.
Three years later, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed the notion of ALU
discretion in Stevens Shipping Company v. Kinlaw. 25' This case involved an
employer's petition for modification of a successful Longshore claim.252 The
ALJ declined to reopen the claim because the evidence presented by the
employer did not suggest the need for modification and because a new hearing
would not promote justice.253 The Fourth Circuit noted the language in Jessee
stating that finality "does not apply to Longshore Act and black lung claims as
it does in ordinary lawsuits." 254 The court also noted that the employer cited no
authority requiring an ALJ to exercise her discretion to reopen. 255 The court
went on to explain:
Banks and O'Keeffe may support the argument that in this case the AL
could have reconsidered her initial decision and ordered an evidentiary
hearing. They do not, however, support the claim that she must do so ....

249. See Old Ben Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 292 F.3d 533,541
(7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Jessee to demonstrate the preference of accuracy over finality in
modification proceedings).
250. See Jessee v.Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 5 F.3d 723, 726 (4th Cir.
1993) (remanding the claim to the ALU for determination of the modification request).
251. See Stevens Shipping Co. v. Kinlaw, No. 99-1954,2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 31354, at
*9 (4th Cir. Dec. 8, 2000) (finding that ALJs should only grant modification if doing so would
promote justice). In Stevens Shipping, the Court considered whether an ALJ abused her
discretion when she denied an employer's request for modification because she found another
evidentiary hearing would not promote justice. Id. at *4-5. The employer filed for modification
of a successful benefits award based on the doctor's evaluation of the stresses of the particular
job in question. Id. at *4.The ALJ denied the petition because she found that the employer
could have presented the evidence it relied on for modification at the initial hearing. Id. at *45. The ALJ determined that allowing modification to give the employer a second chance to
present evidence would not promote justice. Id. The employer appealed, arguing that ALJs
have the authority to simply rethink the question of entitlement even in the absence of new
evidence. Id. at *6-7. The court noted that while ALJs do possess broad discretion to reopen
benefits awards, nothing requires them to do so. Id. at *7.Therefore, the ALJ did not abuse her
discretion and the denial of reopening remained appropriate. Id. at *9-10.
252. See id. at *2 (outlining the procedural history of the case).
253. See id. at *4-5 (reiterating the ALJ finding that after-the-fact observations by the
employer's physician do not present a compelling need for modification).
254. Id. at *7.
255. See id. ("Petitioner does not cite a single authority inwhich the ALJ was required to
exercise that discretion [to reopen].").
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Similarly, in Jessee, we simply ruled that the ALJ had the authority
to
2
consider a modification request, not that he was required to do So. 56
The Fourth Circuit instructed ALJs to reopen only when doing so would
"promote justice" and determined that ALJs should not reopen to allow a party
a second chance to present evidence available at the initial hearing. 25 7 The
Fourth Circuit clarified that Jessee instructs ALJs to consider a variety of
factors, including finality, when exercising their discretion to grant or deny a
petition for modification.2 58
Only two months after this opinion, the Fourth Circuit announced its
decision in Bethenergy Mines, Inc. v. Henderson.259 In this case, the ALJ
declined to correct a mistake of fact because reopening would not render justice
under the Act. 260 The ALJ stated that the operator previously conceded the
existence of pneumoconiosis and that an appeal constituted a more proper
challenge than a petition for modification. 26' The ALJ determined that granting
modification would permit the operator to relitigate its claim and to correct the
mistakes of its counsel.262 However, the Fourth Circuit found that the ALJ
committed an abuse of discretion by denying the operator's petition for
256. Id. at *7-8.
257. See id. at *9 (reinforcing the need for finality in modification determinations).
258. See id. at *7-9 (supporting an ALJ's discretion to evaluate a variety of factors when
considering modification).
259. See Bethenergy Mines, Inc. v. Henderson, No. 99-2495,2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 2390,
at * 10-12 (4th Cir. Feb. 16, 2001) (holding that an ALJ abuses her discretion if she denies
reopening solely in the interest of finality). In Bethenergy, the Fourth Circuit addressed whether
an ALJ abused her discretion when she denied a coal operator's petition for modification in the
interests of finality. Id. at *8-9. The operator petitioned for modification of a successful
benefits award based on a physician's recantation of a positive X-ray reading and a subsequent
Supreme Court ruling on the level of proof required to invoke an eligibility presumption. Id. at
*6. The ALJ noted the presence of a mistake in the determination of eligibility, but denied
reopening based on the operator's failure to develop the proper evidence at the first hearing. Id.
at *4. The ALJ found it would not render justice to allow the operator another chance to litigate
its claim when it failed to properly do so during the initial proceeding. Id. at *7-8. The Fourth
Circuit disagreed and found that the ALJ committed an abuse of discretion by denying
modification primarily inthe interest of finality. Id. at *8-9. The court determined that when a
party makes a timely petition for modification, the ALJ may only deny the petition if the
requesting party engaged in misconduct. Id. at *9. The court reasoned that when accuracy and
finality stand at odds, accuracy should trump finality. Id.
260. See id. at *7 (denying the operator's petition for modification although "the
preponderance of the evidence does not establish the existence of pneumoconiosis").
261. See id.; see also Stokes v. George Hyman Constr. Co., 19 Ben. Rev. Bd. Serv. (MB)
110, 113 (Oct. 16, 1986) (finding that legal errors are not grounds for modification).
262. See Bethenergy Mines, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 2390, at *8 (noting the ALJ's
reluctance to "allow Bethenergy either to re-litigate its claim through the back door 'after it
failed on a previous theory' or to correct counsel's misjudgments belatedly").
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modification solely in the interest of finality. 263 The court implied that where a
requesting party produces evidence of a mistake in a determination of fact, the
ALJ may not deny a petition for modification except on the basis of misconduct
by the requesting party. 264 The court went on to expressly disavow the
importance of finality by stating that "[i]n modification cases, the paramount
interest is in ensuring that eligible claimants receive benefits and that ineligible
claimants do not, 2and
when that interest clashes with an interest in finality, the
6
latter must yield. 1
The court supported this statement by citing the Jessee language that
finality "does not apply to Longshore Act and black lung claims as it does in
ordinary lawsuits.2 66 However, the court did not mention Stevens Shipping or
its interpretation that Jessee "simply ruled that the ALJ had the authority' 267
to
consider a modification request, not that he was required to do so."
Bethenergy Mines leaves the Fourth Circuit with an internal fissure regarding
the proper treatment of finality in modification determinations. Stevens
Shipping instructs ALJs that they may consider a variety of factors, including
finality, when evaluating modification requests, 268 while Bethenergy Mines tells
ALJs that "[flinality and resjudicataare not appropriate factors in adjudicating
modification requests. 2 69 It remains unclear which rule currently represents
the law in the Fourth Circuit. The cases only differ in that Stevens Shipping
concerned a claim for Longshore benefits while Bethenergy Mines dealt with a
claim for black lung benefits. It seems inequitable for the Fourth Circuit to
value finality in Longshore claims, while discarding it in black lung claims,
because Title IV of the 1969 Act incorporated the modification provisions from
the Longshore Act into the Federal Black Lung Benefits Program.270
Therefore, if a court had to choose a rule regarding finality, it should choose the
Stevens Shipping rule, and not the Bethenergy Mines rule, because black lung
borrows from Longshore, and not vice versa.
263. See id. (disavowing the importance of finality in modification requests).
264. See id. (noting that the ALJ did not find that the operator had engaged in misconduct).
265. Id. at*12.
266. See id. at *11 (stating that finality does not apply to properly filed modification
requests).
267. Stevens Shipping Co. v. Kinlaw, No. 99-1954, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 31354, at *8
(4th Cir. Dec. 8, 2000).
268. See id. at *9 (reinforcing the need for finality in modification determinations).
269. Bethenergy Mines, Inc. v. Henderson, No. 99-2495, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 2390, at
*I I (4th Cir. Feb. 16, 2001).
270. See Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, § 422, 83
Stat. 792, 796 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 932(a) (2000)) (providing that the DOL
processes black lung claims under the procedural provisions of the Longshore Act).
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C. The Other Circuits
Most federal circuits give ALJs broad discretion to consider a variety of
factors, including finality, when granting or denying modification requests.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia specifically
notes that "even though there was power to reopen, there is no reason to think
that there should be an automatic reopening simply because the Deputy
Commissioner or the Administrative Law Judge found a mistake in a
determination of fact."27 The court went on to instruct ALJs that their
decisions whether or not to reopen should be guided by asking whether
reopening for modification would render justice under the Act. 72 ALJs should
not grant modification requests to parties looking for a back-door route to
relitigate their case.273 The court emphasized that finality should factor into the
reopening decision by stating that:
The congressional purpose in passing the law regarding [modification]
would be thwarted by any lightly considered reopening at the behest of an
employer who, right or wrong, could have presented his side of the case at
the first hearing and who, if right, could have thereby saved all parties a
considerable amount of expense and protracted litigation.274
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit also imparts broad
discretion to ALJs weighing modification requests. 275 The First Circuit held
that even when it may be in the interests of justice to reopen a claim for
modification, ALJs possess the discretion to deny reopening in the interests of
finality. 27 6 The court explained that, although an ALJ could reopen to correct
mistakes in some cases, the statute does not requireher to grant reopening.277
A request for modification remains a plea to the ALJ's discretion. 278 The
philosophy behind giving great weight to finality stems from the notion that the
271.

McCord v. Cephas, 532 F.2d 1377, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

272.
273.

See id. at 1380-81 (discussing the appropriate standard for reopening).
See id. at 1381 (noting that parties must put their best arguments forward at the initial

hearing).
274.

Id.

275. See Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 673 F.2d 23,
25-26 (1st Cir. 1982) (finding that ALJs should balance accuracy and finality in modification
determinations).
276. See id. at 25 ("[A] court must balance the need to render justice against the need for
finality in decision-making.").
277. See id. (providing that finality should remain an important factor when evaluating
modification requests).
278. See id. at 26 (noting that the employer did not present a convincing argument for
reopening the case).
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"orderly administration ofjustice...
depends in no small part upon finality of
2 79

judicial determinations.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also values
finality in modification determinations. 280 While ALJs may grant modification
based on a simple review of the evidence, they should not grant modification to
give a party another chance to present its case. 28 ' The actions of the attorney,
although they may result in the possibility of an erroneous benefits award, are
binding on the party.282 The Eleventh Circuit's stance directly conflicts with
the Seventh Circuit's holding in Old Ben.28' In Old Ben, the Seventh Circuit
criticized the Eleventh Circuit's rule preventing parties from using modification
to correct mistakes of counsel because it relies heavily on finality. 28 4 The
Supreme Court instructed ALJs to consider accuracy and finality when
considering whether reopening will render justice under the Act. 285 Indeed, the
28 7
286
United States Courts of Appeals for the First Circuit, the Fourth Circuit,

the Sixth Circuit,288 the Ninth Circuit,28 9 and the District of Columbia 290 join
279.

Id.

280. See Verdane v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 772 F.2d 775, 780 (11 th Cir. 1985)
(stating that Congress did not intend modification to save a party from the consequences of his
own counsel's errors).
281. See id. at 780 (setting forth the appropriate inquiry for modification requests).
282. See Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89,92-93 (1990) (stating that under
our system of representative litigation, each party must be bound to its counsel's mistakes and
that a party's only recourse comes from an action against its counsel for malpractice).
283. See Old Ben Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 292 F.3d 533,
545-46 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that the lack of new evidence required for reopening implies
that even challenges of attorney error may be grounds for reopening).
284. See id. at 544-45 ("[L]anguage in these cases that emphasizes finality interests cannot
easily be squared with the language of the statute, the holdings of the Supreme Court, or the
holdings of other circuits ....
").
285. See O'Keeffe v. Aerojet-Gen. Shipyards, Inc., 404 U.S. 254,255 (1971) (per curiam)
(instructing ALJs to reopen only when doing so will promote justice).
286. See Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 673 F.2d 23,
25-26 (1st Cir. 1982) (finding that ALJs should balance accuracy and finality in modification
determinations).
287. See Stevens Shipping Co. v.Kinlaw, No. 99-1954, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 31354, at
*9-10 (4th Cir. Dec. 8, 2000) (finding that finality remains a valuable factor in preventing
parties from abusing the modification procedure).
288. See York v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, No. 95-3555, 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 24016, at *10 (6th Cir. 1996) ("An allegation of mistake should not be allowed to
become a back door route to retrying a case because one party thinks he can make a better
showing on the second attempt.").
289. See McDonald v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 897 F.2d 1510, 1513
(9th Cir. 1990) (acknowledging that ALJs should examine finality concerns when determining
whether reopening will renderjustice under the Act).
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the Eleventh Circuit in interpreting Congress's language to support a reopening
inquiry guided by both accuracy and finality.
VI. Striking the Balance: Rendering Justice RequiresExamining Both
Accuracy and Finality
An ALJ should consider both accuracy and finality when deciding whether
to reopen a claim for modification. The DOL should rethink the position it
took in Old Ben and engage in a thoughtful rulemaking proceeding aimed at
specifying the importance of both accuracy and finality in the reopening
inquiry.291 However, until the DOL recognizes the benefits of such a
rulemaking process, federal courts of appeals should find that a proper exercise
of ALJ discretion in modification petitions includes evaluating both accuracy
and finality. 29 2 ALJs must have the discretion to base determinations on
finality, as well as accuracy, because providing for final resolutions in benefits
determinations reduces the ability of parties with substantial resources to
purchase victory through repeated opportunities for litigation.293
A. Accuracy
When evaluating a petition for modification, an ALJ should determine
whether reopening will promote justice by correcting a mistake in a
determination of fact or by accounting for a change in conditions.294 ALJs must
perform the role assigned to them by Congress-to deciding claims based on an
adjudicatory record. 295 Repeated litigation over individual benefits awards

290.
See McCord v. Cephas, 532 F.2d 1377, 1380-81 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (rejecting the
notion that ALJs should grant modification automatically).

291. See Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 515 U.S. 291, 300 (1995) (determining that
changes in the modification process are "better directed at Congress or the Director in her
rulemaking capacity"), vacated by Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs v. Rambo, 515
U.S. 1139 (1995), vacated by Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121 (1997).
292. See supra notes 286-90 and accompanying text (noting that many circuits already
follow a standard that allows for the evaluation of accuracy and finality).
293. See Old Ben Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 292 F.3d 533,
554-55 (7th Cir. 2002) (Wood, J., dissenting) (warning that repetitive modifications can

actually distort accuracy).
294.
295.

See 33 U.S.C. § 922 (2000) (providing the appropriate grounds for modification).
See id. § 919 (outlining ALJ duties).
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erodes the accuracy of the record in specific claims and the overall precision of
the benefits process.296

By providing for endless modification opportunities, the Seventh Circuit
loses its way in its quest for accuracy. The Seventh Circuit proclaims that
accuracy should be the primary concern of the modification inquiry.297
However, the court undermines its own search for accuracy because its decision
in Old Ben threatens to reduce the precision of benefits determinations by
multiplying the chances for parties to distort the record of a claim.298 Coal
operators stand to benefit the most from multiple opportunities to litigate
because their financial resources far surpass those of most miners. 29 9 The DOL
recognized this imbalance in resources between miners and operators and
attempted to level the playing field with new rules limiting the submission of
medical evidence. 3°
Wide financial disparity provided coal operators with an opportunity to

overwhelm claimants with vast amounts of costly medical evidence. 30 1 Miners
could not compete with the superior economic resources of operators when
developing their own medical evidence.30 2 This imbalance of resources
between the parties threatened the pursuit of accuracy. 3 Inequality in the
amount of evidence distorted the medical record in the operators' favor because
miners must establish eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. 3°4 Many
claimants found it impossible to meet the preponderance standard in light of the
296. See Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 673 F.2d 23,
25-26 (1st Cir. 1982) (finding that repeated litigation hinders the "orderly administration of
justice").
297. See Old Ben, 292 F.3d at 541-42 (finding that accuracy trumps finality in
modification inquiries).
298. See id. at 538 (noting the ALJ's conclusion that repeated proceedings skew the
evidentiary record).
299. See Toler, supra note 110, at 179 (describing the effects of the gap in financial
resources between coal operators and miners).
300. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as Amended, 62 Fed. Reg. 3338, 3338 (proposed Jan. 22,
1997) (determining that disparity in financial resources between miners and operators
necessitates rules for limiting their impact on determinations).
301. See id. (observing that operators "generate medical evidence in such volume that it
overwhelms the evidence supporting entitlement that claimants can procure").
302. See, e.g., Bethenergy Mines, Inc. v. Henderson, No. 99-2495,2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
2390, at *6-7 (4th Cir. Feb. 16, 2001) (recounting that the miner presented two positive X-rays
and the operator submitted forty-one negative X-rays).
303. See Murchison, supranote 8, at 1058 (discussing due process concerns created by the
imbalance of resources).
304. See Bethenergy Mines, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 2390, at *6-7 (discussing the effect of
cumulative evidence on a presumption).
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twenty, thirty, or even forty medical opinions solicited by operators. 3° ' To cure
the imbalance in resources and preserve accurate determinations, the DOL
issued strict rules on the amount
of evidence each party may submit in their
30 6
affirmative cases and rebuttals.
Unfortunately, the DOL did not issue rules addressing the effects of
financial disparity in the modification context. The federal circuits, other than
the Seventh Circuit, allow ALJs to consider finality in order to prevent the
distortion that could result from endless litigating opportunities. 3 °' However,
under the Old Ben standard, the same imbalance in resources that distorted the
accuracy of medical evidence threatens to decrease the accuracy of benefits
determinations. A former black lung ALJ predicted that focusing solely on
accuracy "would encourage a practice whereby parties would delay developing
evidence until they had 'tested the waters' at the first trial by giving parties a
second opportunity to litigate the same issues via a petition for modification."'30
Judge Wood made a similar argument in her dissent in Old Ben.30 9 Judge
Wood feared that the majority's holding would "encourage employers to come
back once a year to try to deprive employees of their awards."3 This fear
demands that ALJs exercise their discretion by considering whether a concern
for accuracy militates against a finding that modification will render justice
under the Act.
The ALJ in Old Ben echoed Judge Wood's concern when she noted that
finality actually protects accuracy in a system with such financial disparity
between the parties.3 1' The ALJ noted that allowing perpetual modification
actually impairs accuracy because:
[It forces] a Claimant who has received a favorable decision to defend
against the superior resources of an Employer who could conceivably come
305. See Murchison, supra note 8, at 1058-59 (reporting examples of large disparities in
the amount of medical evidence submitted by miners and operators).
306. See 20 C.F.R. § 725.414(a) (2003) (limiting miners and operators to two X-ray
submissions each).
307. See supra notes 286-90 and accompanying text (noting the federal circuits that value
accuracy and finality).
308. See Gerald Mavin Bober & Judith K. Gunderson, A Judge's Perspective on the
Presentation of Evidence at a Black Lung Hearing,50 TENN. L. REv. 491, 511-12 (1983)
(providing valuable insight from an AiU into the various issues surrounding modification).
309. See Old Ben Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 292 F.3d 533,
549-55 (7th Cir. 2002) (Wood, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority conclusion that
accuracy should always trump finality in modification).
310. Id. at 554 (Wood, J., dissenting).
311. See id. at 555 (Wood, J., dissenting) ("[li]t is the employer who is likely to have
sufficient resources for this kind of endless proceeding.").
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back year after year with "new" medical opinions, until the sheer weight of
those opinions, all of which could have been presented during earlier
proceedings, forced a decision in the Employer's favor.31 2

This argument demonstrates the critical need for the consideration of finality in
black lung benefits claims.
The Old Ben decision also threatens accuracy because it increases the lack
of legal representation for coal miners. To establish eligibility for benefits,
miners must face off in adversarial proceedings against their former
employers.3? 1 3 Miners frequently apply for benefits without representation
because they cannot afford it, cannot find it, or do not realize they need it. 3t 4 If
they can afford it, miners seeking counsel frequently cannot find it because
attorneys shy away from representing black lung claimants due to the extreme
length of black lung claims, the extremely low success rate for miners, and
federal rules preventing attorneys from collecting fees until after a miner
receives a final benefits award. 3 5 The Old Ben decision threatens to exacerbate
this lack of representation, and thereby hinder the pursuit of accuracy, by
encouraging "employers to come back once a year to try to deprive employees
of their awards. 31 6 Opening up successful claims to repeated modification
requests results in a wider disparity in legal resources between miners and
operators because fewer and fewer attorneys will fight decade-long battles over
perpetually challengeable awards. ALJs must possess the authority to say
"enough is enough" and deny a petition for modification because the interests
of accuracy demand a final resolution.3 7
A concern with accuracy prompted Congress to allow ALJs to modify
benefits awards to correct mistakes of facts and to account for changes in
condition.3a1 However, like an artist who in the pursuit of perfection never
312. Id.
at 538.
313. See Toler, supra note 110, at 179 ("[M]ost miners are out-manned, out-gunned, and
out-spent from the very second they enter a courtroom, by the same companies that have
poisoned them.").
314. See Nixon, supra note 139 (noting that few Virginia attorneys take black lung cases
because the cases can last for several years and attorneys must follow strict regulations on
collection of fees).
315. See Toler, supra note I10, at 178 (arguing that a low success rate and adelayed fee
scheme discourage many attorneys from taking black lung claims).
316. Old Ben Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 292 F.3d 533, 554
(7th Cir. 2002) (Wood, J., dissenting).
317. See Stevens Shipping Co. v.Kinlaw, No. 99-1954, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 31354, at
*9 (4th Cir, Dec. 8, 2000) (noting that reopening to allow a party a second chance to prevent
evidence available at the first hearing does not promote justice under the Act).
318. See 33 U.S.C. § 922 (2000) (providing the appropriate grounds for modification).
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finishes a painting, the Seventh Circuit creates an unrealistic standard.
Accuracy is a legitimate goal, but open-ended and repetitious modification
proceedings do not advance precision. ALJs must have the authority to deny
modification if repeated proceedings will distort, rather than enhance, the
accuracy of the record in an individual claim.
B. Finality
Traditional notions of finality do not apply in black lung benefits
claims. 1 However, the Seventh Circuit goes too far by entirely eliminating
finality from the black lung landscape. The Seventh Circuit ignores the broad
discretion afforded to ALJs by O 'Keeffe and prevents ALJs from following
Congress's instruction to reopen benefits awards for modification only when
doing so would "render justice under the act.0 20 Until the DOL heeds the
intent of Congress and solidifies finality's importance in black lung claims, the
federal courts of appeals should take the affirmative step to craft a carefully
tailored concept of finality that will guide ALJ discretion. This carefully
tailored concept provides ALJs with three conditions of finality to consider
during the reopening inquiry: (1) diligence; (2) futility; and (3) motive.
An ALJ should deny a petition for modification if a lack of diligence by
the requesting party prevented it from presenting the evidence it now relies on
for modification. 32 ' By examining the requesting party's overall diligence, the
ALJ can take into account mitigating circumstances like self-representation or
the opposing party's failure to cooperate in discovery.322 A diligence
requirement prevents a party from exploiting modification to re-litigate its
claim. Parties may not request modification as a back-door attempt to present
evidence and arguments that the party could have presented at the original
hearing.32 3
319.

See 7 ARTHUR LARSON &

LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW

§ 127.07[7] (2000) (observing that workers' compensation systems must possess the flexibility
necessary to account for changes in the condition of workers).
320. See O'Keeffe v. Aerojet-Gen. Shipyards, Inc., 404 U.S. 254, 255-56 (1971) (per
curiam) (stating that ALJs possess broad discretion to reopen benefits awards).
321. See Old Ben, 292 F.3d at 554 (Wood, J., dissenting) (proposing that diligence should
be part of an ALJ inquiry into the appropriateness ofmodification). But see id. at 547 (arguing
that diligence remains a factor under the majority's standard, but that it "cabins the discretion of
the ALJ to keep in mind the basic determination of Congress that accuracy of determination is to
be given great weight in all determinations under the Act").
322. See Stevens Shipping Co., 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 31354, at *6-8 (noting that ALJs
may consider a wide variety of factors when exercising their discretion to reopen).
323. See York v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, No. 95-3555, 1996 U.S. App.
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The AL also should determine whether futility precludes reopening
because, for example, state law forecloses recovery of moneys paid to a
deceased miner.32 4 Old Ben represents a perfect example of a futile
modification because Illinois law prevented recovery from the miner's estate
for any overpayments by the DOL. A futile modification may also occur if a
miner produced enough evidence to meet a statutory presumption of
no number of negative Xentitlement. Once the miner meets the presumption,
3 25
rays should overturn the finding of eligibility.
Finally, ALJs should determine whether modification represents an
appropriate use of judicial resources. Diligence and futility overlap with this
determination, but the AUJ also should look deeper into the requesting party's
motive.326 An AU should not grant a modification petition if the requesting
party merely hopes to stall payment of benefits or to harass the other party.327
Even the accuracy-centered Old Ben standard provides for denial of a
modification petition if the requesting party engaged in reprehensible
behavior.328
Courts value finality because the public desires bringing litigation to a
close. 329 Bringing disputes to a final resolution relieves miners and coal
operators of the burdens of repeatedly presenting arguments and developing

LEXIS 24016, at * 10 (6th Cir. Apr. 17, 1996) (determining that claimants must make their best
arguments at the initial stages of a claim).
324. See Claimant-Respondent's Supplemental Memorandum at 4, Old Ben Coal Co. v.
Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 292 F.3d 533 (7th Cir. 2002) (No. 00-3222) (arguing
that Illinois law barred the DOL from presenting a claim against Mr. Hilliard's estate for any
alleged overpayment) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Old Ben represents a
futile reopening because Illinois law barred the DOL from recovering from Mr. Hilliard's estate
because the DOL did not bring aclaim against Mr. Hilliard's estate within the proscribed twoyear window. See 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18-12(b) (2000) (stating that "all claims which could
have been barred under this section are, in any event, barred 2 years after decedent's death").
325. See 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(3) (2000) (providing an irrebuttable presumption of total
disability based on medical evidence of lung abnormalities).
326. See McCord v. Cephas, 532 F.2d 1377, 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (analyzing the
employer's motive and concluding that "[i]t would be difficult to describe a history of greater
recalcitrance, of greater callousness towards the processes ofjustice, and of greater self-serving
ignorance").
327. See Old Ben Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 292 F.3d 533, 552
(7th Cir. 2002) (Wood, J., dissenting) (observing that ALJs should deny reopening upon any
evidence of intentional misuse of the modification process).
328. See id. at 545 (providing that a party engaging in misconduct should not enjoy the
benefits of modification).
329. See H.L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 143 (198 ) (discussing the advantages and
disadvantages of finality and concluding that finality helps predict the present state of the law).
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costly medical evidence. 330 This becomes especially important for the many
disabled miners and their families who typically depend on a fixed income
made up in part by federal black lung benefits.33' It also eases the legal
expenses for coal operators who may face hundreds of claims from individual
miners. If each claim proceeds through modification multiple times, the
number of potential hearings and evidentiary submissions quickly becomes
daunting.
Finality also avoids unnecessary judicial waste by forcing parties to
present their best arguments and evidence at initial proceedings. 332 The Federal
Black Lung Benefits Program cannot afford superfluous adjudications. The
benefits program bears a well-deserved reputation for taking years, and even
decades, to adjudicate benefits claims.333 The Old Ben decision, which requires
ALJs to follow a nearly automatic modification standard, will only serve to
further bog down this marathon-like benefits process.334 In order to maintain
any sense ofjudicial efficiency, ALJs should exercise their broad discretion to
reopen benefits awards only when doing so will render justice under the Act,
and not merely because one party believes it can present a better case the
second time around.
Judge Wood argued that if Congress truly wanted finality to play no part
in ALJ decisions, the modification statute would instruct ALJs that they "must"
reopen, rather than "may" reopen. 3 Congress granted ALJs broad discretion
because their intimate knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding
individual claims allows them to effectively promote justice by balancing the
pursuit of accuracy with the need for final resolutions.336 The federal courts of
330. See Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412-13 (2000) (noting that courts may
dismiss duplicative arguments sua sponte).
331. See Toler, supra note 110, at 178-79 (describing the dire economic circumstances
common among miners).
332. See McCord v. Cephas, 532 F.2d 1377, 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (urging parties to put
their best arguments forward during the original claim proceeding because they may not do so in
later stages if they simply chose not to present their arguments during the original hearing).
333. See Murchison, supra note 8, at 1027 (relaying that many miners "wholeheartedly
despise" the Black Lung Benefits Program because of its adversarial nature and extremely slow
benefits determinations).
334. See Old Ben Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 292 F.3d 533, 555
(7th Cir. 2002) (Wood, J., dissenting) (predicting that the decision in Old Ben will result in an
"endless proceeding").
335. See id. at 550 (Wood, J., dissenting) (noting that Congress uses the language of
discretion to describe ALJ authority to grant or deny modification requests).
336. See O'Keeffe v. Aerojet-Gen. Shipyards, Inc., 404 U.S. 254, 256 (1971) (per curiam)

(stating that Congress intended ALJs to "review factual errors in an effort 'to render justice
under the act"').
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appeals should not adopt the Seventh Circuit's approach because it unduly
restricts ALJ discretion by holding that ALJs should not deny modification in
the interest of finality.3 37 The federal courts of appeals should adopt the
standard proposed in this Note that roots ALJ discretion in a carefully tailored
concept of finality. By examining diligence, futility, and motive, ALJs can
confidently determine whether reopening a black lung benefits claim will truly
render justice under the Act.
VII. Conclusion
History shows that coal miners must struggle for any benefit that eases the
burdens of their deadly occupation. Coal miners waged hard-fought battles
against mine operators, their own union, and even the federal government to
earn the most modest of reforms.338 Therefore, it seems perversely natural that
the Federal Black Lung Benefits Program pits miners against their former
employers in adversarial proceedings.3 39 However, while most agree that every
battle must have an end, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Old Ben threatens to
create perpetual litigation between miners and operators over the validity of
benefits awards.340 In order to avoid the destruction that accompanies
everlasting conflicts, ALJs must possess broad discretion to value both
accuracy and finality when evaluating petitions for modification.
The Supreme Court's broad grant of discretion to ALJs to render justice
under the Act should not be restricted by an overbearing preoccupation with
accuracy. ALJs should evaluate whether reopening promotes justice before
requiring parties to argue the merits of a prior benefits decision. 4' To
337.

See Old Ben, 292 F.3d at 550-51 (Wood, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority

overly cabins ALJ discretion).
338. See RiCHARD D. LuNr, LAW AND ORDER VS. THE MINERS 11-17 (1979) (describing
brutal conflicts ranging from the bloody West Virginia mine wars of the 1920s to internal
struggles within the UMWA).

339. See Prunty & Solomons, supra note 70, at 670-71 (arguing that many conflicts
pertaining to black lung benefits arise from the differing viewpoints of coal miners, who see the
program as a type of pension, and mine operators, who believe they are footing the bill for
economic relief in the depressed coal fields).
340. See Old Ben Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 292 F.3d 533,555
(7th Cir. 2002) (Wood, J., dissenting) (fearing that Old Ben will lead to repetitive and
unnecessary modification requests).
341. E-mail from Sandra M. Fogel, attorney for Mrs. Hilliard in Old Ben, to Brian Hager
(Feb. 6, 2003, 10:38:00 EST) (proposing a two-part modification process whereby an ALJ
would first determine whether modification will render justice under the Act and then, if the
AU grants modification, the AUJ would hold a hearing on the merits) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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determine whether modification will "render justice under the act," ALJs must
examine both accuracy and finality. Congress accounted for this delicate
balancing of interests by providing ALJs, those with the greatest knowledge of
the facts and circumstances surrounding an individual claim, with broad
discretion to grant or deny modification to render justice under the Act.3 42 The
DOL and the federal courts of appeals should reject the Seventh Circuit's
overzealous concern with accuracy and adopt the approach proposed in this
Note. This approach allows ALJs to exercise their full discretion to consider
the precision of benefits awards and the conditions of finality. By doing so,
ALJs meet the expectations of Congress by providing for accurate benefits
awards while also accounting for society's interest in the finality of judicial
determinations.

342. See O'Keeffe v. Aerojet-Gen. Shipyards, Inc., 404 U.S. 254,256 (1971) (per curiam)
(finding that Congress intended the modification procedure to provide ALJs "with broad
discretion to correct mistakes of fact, whether demonstrated by wholly new evidence,
cumulative evidence, or merely further reflection on the evidence initially submitted").

